Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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If Candidate A only gives himself 1/5th of his own votes to help himself beat B, or split his votes so that 5/9ths go to him and 4/9ths to B (in proportion to the difference in strength of preference), then B wins. This example is more farcical, but in general, [[utilitarianism]] can be viewed through an Asset lens as negotiators only weakly pushing for some preferences. Asset may even be modelable as one of the cardinal PR methods when all negotiators' preferences are cardinal and not ranked.
== Notes ==
Asset voting's [[party list case]] is [[D'Hondt]]. This is because negotiators can always split votes per seat in an optimal fashion to get as many seats as they'd get in D'Hondt.
Asset passes [[Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives]], because once the negotiators start discussing electing Smith set members, they won't be able to form a coalition in favor of a non-Smith candidate, and any Smith candidate is likely to be viable since there is a [[beat-or-tie path]] between all of them.
== References ==
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