Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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Asset voting's [[party list case]] is [[D'Hondt]]. This is because negotiators can always split votes per seat in an optimal fashion to get as many seats as they'd get in D'Hondt.
Asset passes [[Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives]], because once the negotiators start discussing electing Smith set members, they won't be able to form a coalition in favor of a non-Smith candidate, and any Smith candidate is likely to be viable since there is a [[beat-or-tie path]] between all of them.
Under certain assumptions, Asset passes [[Pareto|Independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives]]. This is because the Pareto-dominating alternative will [[pairwise beat]] the Pareto-dominated alternative, and there is no incentive for any negotiator to elect the Pareto-dominated alternative instead of the Pareto candidate. So the negotiators would have an incentive to discard consideration of any Laredo-dominated alternatives.
== References ==
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