Asset voting: Difference between revisions
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49 B:5
If the max score is 5, then A 100% supports himself and 80% supports B. In general, to solve these situations, each voter should only give to their favorite candidate as much of their vote as their strength of preference for them i.e. someone who only 80% supports their favorite and 60% supports their second choice gives their favorite 80% of a vote, leaving 20% unusable. Then, to determine how the votes are transferred in head-to-head matchups, you find the fraction for the support for the less-preferred candidate divided by the support for the more-preferred candidate, and divide this by 2; this is the fraction of the more-preferred candidate's votes you transfer to the less-preferred candidate for that voter. This will replicate the utility margin between the two candidates. So here, for the 51 voters, the fraction is 80/100=(4/5)/2=2/5 so they transfer 2/5ths of their votes for A to B. The 49 B voters' fraction is 0/100 i.e. they don't support A at all, so they don't give any of their votes for B to A. So the final vote total is A 30.6 B 69.4, creating a vote margin of 38.8 in favor of B. This replicates the utility margin, which was A 51 subtracted from B (49 + 51*0.8)=89.8, which is 38.8.
If the max score is 5, then A 100% supports himself and 80% supports B. Thus, if Candidate A only gives himself 1/5th (100%-80%=20%) of his own votes to help himself beat B i.e. gives himself 3/5ths of his votes and B 2/5ths, such that there's a 1/5th difference (in proportion to the difference in strength of preference), then B wins. This example is somewhat farcical, but in general, [[utilitarianism]] can be viewed through an Asset lens as negotiators only weakly pushing for some preferences. Asset may even be modelable as one of the cardinal PR methods when all negotiators' preferences are cardinal and not ranked. ▼
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== Notes ==
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