Borda count: Difference between revisions
Tactical voting in an MBC
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==Potential for BC tactical voting==
Like most voting methods, The Borda count is vulnerable to compromising. That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot.
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In response to the issue of strategic manipulation in the Borda count, M. de Borda said "My scheme is only intended for honest men."
<big><u>Tactical voting in decision-making in an MBC</u></big>
In majority voting, the two options listed are (regarded as being) mutually exclusive. So it is that, for example, in the Balkans, the 1991 referendum - "Are you Serb or Croat?" - disenfranchised any partner in, or adult child of, a mixed relationship... or anyone who wanted to vote for a compromise, or more importantly, for peace.
In an MBC of, say, five options, not every option will be totally mutually exclusive of all the other options. If, then, the two winning options are 'neck-and-neck', a composite may be formed based on the most popular option, as amended by those parts of the runner-up which are compatible with the winning option. The voter's 2nd preference should therefore best be his/her actual desire. As the old saying goes, "be careful what you wish for."
==Effect on factions and candidates==
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