Borda count: Difference between revisions
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The Borda count also does not satisfy the [[majority criterion]], i.e. if a majority of voters rank one candidate in first place, that candidate is not guaranteed to win. This could be considered a disadvantage for Borda count in political elections, but it also could be considered an advantage if the favorite of a slight majority is strongly disliked by most voters outside the majority, in which case the Borda winner could have a higher overall utility than the majority winner. However, Borda does satisfy the majority criterion in the two-candidate case, meaning that it has a [[spoiler effect]] when it doesn't elect the [[Condorcet winner]] (because the CW would guaranteeably win when it's just them and any other candidate).
[[Donald G. Saari]] created a mathematical framework for evaluating positional methods in which he showed that Borda count has fewer opportunities for strategic voting than other positional methods, such as [[plurality voting]] or [[anti-plurality voting]], e.g.; "vote for two", "vote for three", etc.{{Cn}}<!-- Calls into question relevance of Durrand et al.; Borda is extremely vulnerable to strategy, but it has fewer *opportunities* for it. How do we know Condorcification doesn't do the same thing? -->
The MBC and the Condorcet rules are the only voting procedures which count ''all'' the preferences cast by ''all'' voters ''always''; they are the most accurate. Given that the MBC is vulnerable to the independence criterion, while the Condorcet rule is prone to a paradox, but not vice versa, the best voting procedure of all could be a combined MBC/Condorcet analysis - a proposal first made by Charles Dodgson.
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