CDTT: Difference between revisions
Changed DSC: there's no theorem that proves this AFAIK, there's just a lack of methods that pass LNH, monotonicity, and clone independence.
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(Changed DSC: there's no theorem that proves this AFAIK, there's just a lack of methods that pass LNH, monotonicity, and clone independence.) |
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*'''[[Plurality voting|First-Preference Plurality]]''': This is decisive, simple, and [[Monotonicity criterion|monotone]], but fails Clone Independence.
*'''[[Instant-runoff voting|Instant Runoff Voting]]''': This is more complicated. It satisfies Clone Independence but not [[Monotonicity criterion|monotonicity]]. The IRV ranking would be the reverse of the candidates' elimination order.
*'''[[Descending Solid Coalitions]]''': This is also somewhat complicated, but it's the only known non-random option which satisfies
*'''[[Minmax|MinMax (Pairwise Opposition)]]''': This has the advantage that it is calculated based on the pairwise matrix, just as the CDTT itself is. However, it is somewhat indecisive and fails Clone Independence. It satisfies [[Monotonicity criterion|Mono-raise]].
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