Cardinal voting systems: Difference between revisions
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{{Wikipedia|Cardinal voting}}
'''Cardinal voting
Cardinal voting is when each voter can assign a numerical score to each candidate. Strictly speaking, cardinal voting can pass more information than the ordinal (rank) voting. This can clearly be seen by the fact that a rank can be derived from a set of numbers provided there are more possible numbers than candidates. Unlike ordinal voting, [[W:Arrow's Impossibility Theorem|Arrow's Impossibility Theorem]] does not apply to cardinal methods. Furthermore, all cardinal methods satisfy the participation criterion.
In Cardinal voting, if any set of voters increase a candidate's score, it obviously can help him, but cannot hurt him. That is a restatement of monotonicity. It is a stricter requirement than Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives so it is satisfied as well. As such, a voter’s score for candidate C in no way affects the battle between A vs. B. Hence, a voter can give their honest opinion of C without fear of a wasted vote or hurting A. There is never incentive for favorite betrayal by giving a higher score to a candidate who is liked less.
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[http://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSE/ Voter Satisfaction Efficiency] (VSE) is a newer model which has been used to evaluate voting method utility. VSE is an inverse of Bayesian Regret, with higher scores representing better utility. STAR Voting was found to have the highest Voter Satisfaction Efficiency rating overall.
== [[Single Member systems|Single Member
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| [[Score Voting]]|| [[Utilitarian winner | Sum]] || > 2
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