Cardinal voting systems: Difference between revisions
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Furthermore, there are other [[Voting paradox| Impossibility Theorems]] which are different than Arrow's and apply to cardinal systems. The most relevant are the [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] and the [[Balinski–Young theorem]]. The [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] (published in 1973) holds that any deterministic process of collective decision making with multiple options will have some level of [[strategic voting]]. As a result of this much of the work of social choice theorists is to find out what types of [[strategic voting]] a system is susceptible to and the level of susceptibility for each. For example [[Single Member system | Single Member systems]] are not susceptible to [[Free riding]]. The [[Balinski–Young theorem]] holds that a system cannot satisfy a [[Quota rule | Quota Rule]] while having both [[House monotonicity criterion | House monotonicity]] and [[Population monotonicity]]. This is important because quota rules are used in most definitions of [[Proportional representation]] and [[Population monotonicity]] is intimatly tied to the [[Participation criterion]].
==== Kotze-Pereira transformation ====
{{Main|Kotze-Pereira transformation}}The KP transform converts rated ballots that allow for more than two scores into equivalent fractional rated ballots that allow for only two scores i.e. it transforms scored ballots into Approval ballots.
It helps show the connection between different scales in a similar way to the [[Approval rating|approval rating]] concept.
[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
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