Cardinal voting systems: Difference between revisions
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→Determining relative accuracy or utility between voting methods: delete extra paragraph
(→Single Member systems: Added section on "Determining relative accuracy or utility between voting methods." Moved Bayesian Regret paragraph to this section and added a paragraph on VSE. Included STAR Voting in summary findings in this section and added note that STAR was not tested in BR. Fixed "runn-off" typo in single winner chart and made Bayesian Regret capitalization consistent.) |
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It is worth noting why [[Approval Voting]] does not lead to a tyranny of a centrist majority situation. There is difference between a tendency towards a moderate or compromise candidate and a majority candidate. For example, if there is a small group in desire of representation then the candidates would gain approval if they could add the desires of this group to their platform. This means issues that are neutral to the centrist majority and highly relevant to a small group are important for candidates to understand. Additionally, if the overlap of votes is released then the candidates can study the results to determine which candidates represented an isolated group. For example, if there were a candidate who only received votes because of a particular issue, then all candidates would be wise to integrate this issue into their platform for the next election to be more competitive. However, a case can be made that candidates are incentivized to make promised to special interest groups which benefit the few a lot but do not hurt the majority enough for them to get mobilized. In many instances, like with tax code, this effect lowers the total prosperity of the society at large. This effect certainly exists in other systems and it has not been empirically shown that it is more problematic in Approval Voting.
== Determining relative accuracy or utility between voting methods ==
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