Center squeeze: Difference between revisions
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Systems which generally do well with center squeeze include [[Condorcet method|Condorcet systems]] (although in some cases, a center squeeze scenario could become an opportunity for one of the wings to use burial strategy and create an artificial [[Condorcet paradox|Condorcet cycle]]).
== Notes ==
Some voting methods are not only vulnerable to center squeeze, but in fact, make it difficult for voters to combat the effect with strategy. IRV may be one of these: Suppose the 1st choices of the voters are 25% for the Very Liberal party, 10% for the Liberal party, and 20% for the Center party, with the rest going to the Conservative party. Putting the Center party strategically 1st in IRV risks eliminating the Liberal party, at which point their votes may go more towards the Very Liberal party, eliminating the Center party; if a liberal voter desiring consensus instead puts the Liberal party 1st, that makes it more likely the Center party will be eliminated first, and then their voters' 2nd choice may help the Liberal party eliminate the Very Liberal party, resulting in more consensus overall than if the Very Liberal party had won.
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== External links ==
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