Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods: Difference between revisions
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Most [[strategic voting]] in these methods revolves around [[burying]] a rival candidate and making your preferred candidate enter the [[Smith set]], where they might win by having more points/approvals.
Rated Condorcet methods have a stronger resistance to [[center squeeze]] than [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]], because even when an artificial/strategic cycle is created, voters can rate the center candidate highly to make them win, rather than have the center candidate automatically eliminated unless they Favorite Betray.
Point of comparison between rated Condorcet methods and regular rated methods: if a [[mutual majority]] wish to make one of their preferred candidates win in a rated method, they must show maximal support for all of their candidates, not showing any distinction in preference between any of their candidates, and no support to any other candidates. By contrast, in a rated Condorcet method, because many of them pass the [[Smith criterion]], the majority need only vote honestly to make their preferred candidates win, and can also show their preferences among all candidates. This further means that a minority that wants to maximally push for its preferred candidates can do so while showing preference among the majority's candidates without risking its own chances of winning as much.
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