Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods: Difference between revisions
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whereupon '''A wins''' using every one of these Condorcet methods: Tideman [[ranked pairs]], Basic Condorcet, [[Simpson-Kramer|Simpson-Kramer min-max]], and [[Schulze]] beatpaths. (Success!)<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=With strategic voters, Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|last=|first=|date=|website=|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=}}</ref></blockquote>This problem is averted with [[Smith//Score]] or [[Smith//Approval]] if the C>A voters (voters who prefer C to A) move their [[approval threshold]] between C and A, because they can make C have 11 approvals to A's 10. Essentially, they can re-simulate the pairwise matchup between C and A (where C has 11 votes to A's 10) using [[Strategic voting#Definitions|min-max]] strategy to fix the result. This isn't as easy with [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods|Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] or [[:Category:Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods|defeat-dropping Condorcet methods]]; for the most part (ignoring things like the [[Tied at the top rule]], etc.), the only way for C>A voters to fix the result is to [[Favorite Betrayal|Favorite Betray]]. In some sense, this all takes advantage of how rated methods have Nash [[Equilibrium|Equilibriums]] on the Condorcet winner.
One way to demonstrate the result in a rated Condorcet method election is to organize the candidates by [[Smith set ranking]] (if using a Smith-efficient hybrid) and then within each Smith set, organize the candidates by number of points/approvals, showing this number in the cell comparing each candidate to themselves.
[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
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