Condorcet//FPTP: Difference between revisions
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Most Condorcet advocates would likely at the very least prefer the similar, but more complicated [[Condorcet//Approval]] and [[Smith//Score]] methods, as their cycle resolution methods are less prone to the spoiler effect.
'''Smith//FPTP''' is where the candidate with the most 1st choices in the [[Smith set]] wins. This can optionally be done by first transferring the votes of voters who supported non-Smith candidates as their 1st choice to their 1st choice in the Smith set.
Example of both:<blockquote>49 A>B>C
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3 B
48 C>B>A</blockquote>A is the FPTP winner (has 49 1st choices, the most of any candidate), but B is both the Condorcet winner and the only candidate in the Smith set, thus both Condorcet//FPTP and Smith//FPTP would pick B. This is an example of Condorcet//FPTP averting the [[center squeeze effect]].
Example of divergence between the two:<blockquote>18 A1>A2>A3
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49 B1</blockquote>The Smith set here is (A1, A2, A3). There is no Condorcet winner, and the FPTP winner is B1 (49 1st choices), so Condorcet//FPTP would pick B1. Within the Smith set, the FPTP winner is A1 (has 18 1st choices to A2's 17 and A3's 16), so Smith//FPTP would pick A1. Notice that if any two candidates in the Smith set drop out of the race, the remaining candidate would be the [[Majority criterion|majority's 1st choice]] by 51 voters to 49, and thus win in either Condorcet//FPTP or Smith//FPTP. Thus, this is an example of a [[Mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]] failure for Condorcet//FPTP (a majority preferred the (A1, A2, A3) set of candidates above all other candidates (B1) but none of the majority-preferred candidates won).
[[Category:Preferential voting methods]]▼
== Usage ==
In Vermont, Bill H.424<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2024/H.424|title=Bill Status H.424|website=legislature.vermont.gov|access-date=2023-12-22}}</ref> would enable towns, cities, and villages to adopt Condorcet//FPTP for single-seat office elections through a majority vote at a town meeting. The system first checks for a majority winner among first preferences. If none, pairwise Condorcet comparisons are counted and the Condorcet winner is elected. If none, it resorts to a first-past-the-post tiebreaker. Once adopted, the system remains in effect until the community decides to revert to a previous method or another system through a subsequent town meeting vote.
== References ==
<references />
[[Category:Condorcet methods]]
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