Condorcet//FPTP: Difference between revisions
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Most Condorcet advocates would likely at the very least prefer the similar, but more complicated [[Condorcet//Approval]] and [[Smith//Score]] methods, as their cycle resolution methods are less prone to the spoiler effect.
'''Smith//FPTP''' is where the candidate with the most 1st choices in the [[Smith set]] wins. This can optionally be done by first transferring the votes of voters who supported non-Smith candidates as their 1st choice to their 1st choice in the Smith set.
Example of both:<blockquote>49 A>B>C
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3 B
48 C>B>A</blockquote>A is the FPTP winner (has 49 1st choices, the most of any candidate), but B is both the Condorcet winner and the only candidate in the Smith set, thus both Condorcet//FPTP and Smith//FPTP would pick B. This is an example of Condorcet//FPTP averting the [[center squeeze effect]].
Example of divergence between the two:<blockquote>18 A1>A2>A3
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