Condorcet method: Difference between revisions
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==Notes ==
The fundamental argument for Condorcet over other extensions of [[majority rule]] is that it explicitly monitors for the [[Condorcet paradox]]. This is what makes it vulnerable to [[Favorite Betrayal]], however, since voters can make their lesser evil become the CW by preventing their favorite from pairwise beating them. See the [[Tied at the top rule]] for a way out of this.
Any voting method can be made a Condorcet method by simply adding a condition that a Condorcet winner will win if one exists before running the voting method. It is possible to further make a voting method [[Smith-efficient]] by taking various approaches, such as eliminating candidates one by one until there is a Condorcet winner (like in [[Benham's method]]) or eliminating all candidates not in the [[Smith set]] before running the voting method's procedure. It is common terminology for Condorcet methods that start by electing the Condorcet winner if there is one, but otherwise run some other voting method, to be named as "Condorcet//voting method". For example, [[Condorcet//Score]] is [[Score voting]] modified to elect a CW. The Condorcet methods that start by eliminating all candidates not in a given set of candidates and then run some other voting method are named as "Given set//voting method" (sometimes with only one "/"). For example, [[Smith//IRV]] is [[IRV]] run on the [[Smith set]].
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