Condorcet method: Difference between revisions
→Connection to cardinal methods
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Note that the above schemes can make Score fail the logical property that a voter's strength of preference between any pair of candidates must equal the sum of the strengths of preference between all sequential pairs of candidates in a [[beat-or-tie path]] from the first candidate of the pair to the second; see [[Ranked voting#Strength of preference]] for an example. The failure of this property seems to be the major reason traditional Condorcet methods can have Condorcet cycles and one major reason for why they fail certain properties such as Favorite Betrayal and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
[[Approval voting]] can be thought of as a Condorcet method where voters must rank every candidate either 1st or last. This can most clearly be seen by observing that, when voters are limited to ranking candidates in this way in a Condorcet method, then Condorcet methods can be counted in exactly the same way as Approval using the [[Pairwise counting#Negative vote-counting approach]], with the candidate being marked on the most ballots getting the most voters backing them in head-to-head matchups, and thus being the [[CW]].
==Demonstrating pairwise counting==
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