Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions

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Approval Voting (and thus Score Voting when all voters use only the minimum or maximum score) is equivalent to a traditional Condorcet method where a voter must rank all candidates 1st or last. Score Voting where some voters give some candidates intermediate scores can be treated as Approval Voting using the [[KP transform]], and thus treated as a traditional Condorcet method in the same way as Approval Voting.
 
== NotesCriticism ==
The Condorcet criterion has been criticized for certain reasons. Some common arguments are:
 
* Less [[precinct-summable]] than some other voting methods (because it requires [[pairwise counting]])
It is rather common for pollsters to do head-to-head matchup polling to see who is likely to win in an [[FPTP]] general election. Condorcet polling can be done in a similar way, except more efficiently, by allowing polled voters to rank or rate the candidates.
* Possibly less [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] (voters may [[Burying|bury]] with frequency); this is because the Condorcet criterion implies failure of [[later-no-help]].
** The Condorcet criterion also implies failure of [[later-no-harm]], which may incentivize [[bullet voting]]
* Condorcet methods don't take [[strength of preference]] information into account (i.e. a majority with weak preferences may overrule a minority with strong preferences, or stop a [[consensus]] candidate from winning)
** [Rebuttal] This can be addressed to a large extent by using a simple implementation of the [[rated pairwise preference ballot]].
* It implies failure of the [[Favorite Betrayal|Favorite Betrayal criterion]] (possibly leading to [[two-party domination]])
 
Here is one [https://www.fairvote.org/why-the-condorcet-criterion-is-less-important-than-it-seems critique] by FairVote, with some analysis/rebuttals:<blockquote>If there is a Condorcet winner, it means that he or she is preferred to every other candidate – not necessarily liked more than other candidates and not necessarily ready to represent the constituents.</blockquote>
One strategy common to most Condorcet methods is to prevent a candidate from being a Condorcet winner by [[burying]] them (giving them a pairwise defeat against another candidate).
 
The Condorcet criterion has been criticized for certain reasons. Here is one [https://www.fairvote.org/why-the-condorcet-criterion-is-less-important-than-it-seems critique] by FairVote, with some analysis:
 
<blockquote>If there is a Condorcet winner, it means that he or she is preferred to every other candidate – not necessarily liked more than other candidates and not necessarily ready to represent the constituents.</blockquote>
 
If one candidate is preferred over another, it necessarily means the voter likes that candidate more than the other.
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This criticism can easily be averted if the voters on either side of the Democrats simply refuse to rank the Democrats above the other side.
 
== Notes ==
 
It is rather common for pollsters to do head-to-head matchup polling to see who is likely to win in an [[FPTP]] general election. Condorcet polling can be done in a similar way, except more efficiently, by allowing polled voters to rank or rate the candidates.
 
One strategy common to most Condorcet methods is to prevent a candidate from being a Condorcet winner by [[burying]] them (giving them a pairwise defeat against another candidate).
 
'''Alternative definition of "beat" that is claimed to be more consistent with the preferences, intent and wishes of equal-top-ranking voters:'''