Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
→Criticism
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* Possibly less [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] (voters may [[Burying|bury]] with frequency); this is because the Condorcet criterion implies failure of [[later-no-help]].
** The Condorcet criterion also implies failure of [[later-no-harm]], which may incentivize [[bullet voting]]
**Non-Condorcet methods (usually referring to [[Score voting]]) may be more [[Smith-efficient]] than actual Condorcet methods due to <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=RangeVoting.org - How Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|website=rangevoting.org|access-date=2020-05-14}}</ref>.
***[Rebuttal] [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] are less susceptible to this issue than other Condorcet methods; in the example provided, strategic voters could place their [[approval threshold]] in such a way as to elect the CW.
* Condorcet methods don't take [[strength of preference]] information into account (i.e. a majority with weak preferences may overrule a minority with strong preferences, or stop a [[consensus]] candidate from winning)
** [Rebuttal] This can be addressed to a large extent by using a simple implementation of the [[rated pairwise preference ballot]].
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