Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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== Notes ==
The Condorcet criterion has been criticized for certain reasons. Here is one [[https://www.fairvote.org/why-the-condorcet-criterion-is-less-important-than-it-seems|critique]] by FairVote, with some analysis:
: If there is a Condorcet winner, it means that he or she is preferred to every other candidate – not necessarily liked more than other candidates and not necessarily ready to represent the constituents.
If one candidate is preferred over another, it necessarily means the voter likes that candidate more than the other.
: Condorcet winners are centrist by nature, regardless of the preferences of the electorate.
Not necessarily. If an electorate is 55% liberal, the Condorcet winner will be liberal, whereas if the electorate is 55% conservative, the CW will be conservative. They may lean towards the center to some degree (if the minority prefers them more than other candidates supported by the majority), but they do shift with regards to the voters' preferences.
: Consider an election with three candidates: a strong liberal who commands between 40% to 50% of the vote, a moderate with about 10% to 15%, and a strong conservative between 40% and 50%. By being everyone’s second choice, the moderate will certainly be the Condorcet winner as long as neither of the two more extreme candidates earns a majority of the vote. If the electorate is moderate, then great – the Condorcet winner makes sense. But if the electorate mostly wants something to the left or right of the center, is it still the case that the moderate should always win? Wouldn’t the 80% to 90% of voters who lean clearly to one side prefer that their candidate have a nonzero chance of winning, as opposed to the impossibility of victory under Condorcet methods?
The problem with this argument is that if most of the voters prefer something other than the centrist candidate, they are free to rank candidates on both sides above the moderate candidate, which would guarantee the moderate wouldn't be the CW. In other words, if voters indicate they prefer the moderate over the other side, then they shouldn't be surprised if this allows them to get the moderate instead of the one of the other side's candidates as a winner.
:Looking to Burlington [...] The mayor was vulnerable, but Montroll only secured 22% of first choices and only 29% when the field was reduced to three, basically failing to make the case for his candidacy to enough people. If Montroll had won due to Condorcet voting being in place, the resulting controversy in Burlington would likely have been far louder than the outcry against Kiss’s IRV victory. Having a candidate win after being in last place when the field was reduced to three would have taken a lot of explaining to voters. They might have accepted the results; more likely, they would have challenged them, particularly if they understood that Democrats would suddenly be the dominant party in mayor’s race even when failing to finish in the top two.
This criticism can easily be averted if the voters on either side of the Democrats simply refuse to rank the Democrats above the other side.
'''Alternative definition of "beat" that is claimed to be more consistent with the preferences, intent and wishes of equal-top-ranking voters:'''
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