Consecutive Runoff Approval Voting: Difference between revisions

Careless thinking might lead us to see a ''winner take all syndrome'' as the cause of our inflexible two-party pseudo-democracy. BUT THAT IS TOTALLY WRONG. The real cause of the two-party pseudo-democracy is really the direct consequence of THE BLACK HAT SYNDROME! This Black Hat Syndrome (or "spoiler effect") is the outcome that results when we have a White Hat (relative to each individual voter -- say, for example, Ralph Nader), a Gray Hat (say, for example, John Kerry), and a Black Hat (say, for example, George W. Bush) in a political contest. You cannot vote for the White Hat without "sacrificing" the vote you would have otherwise used to fend ofoff an election of the Black Hat. So you will just never get to vote for a White Hat, an thus anything like a third party is out of the question.

I will now provide the solution (which definitely is not IRV -- unlike IRV it does not demand that all information from every ballot must be gathered into one central counting location, and it only requires simple addition -- it is intrinsically extremely simple. It requires three consecutive runoffs, but if we can ask people to fight and die in Iraq for years, we can surely ask them to vote three times. Besides, it provides a deliberative process, and an opportunity for participation, instead of a mere ritual. (I indulge in a liberal perspective, but these arguments would also hold if viewed from a conservative perspective.)

Round one of a Consecutive Approval Voting election is an approval, not a plurality method of election. Therefor, each voter gets to give just one vote to each candidate that she or he "approves of" (finds acceptable) up to twenty choices (so wacky people don't list thousands of candidates out of a phone book). From start to finish, parties are only advocacy networks; this voting system is "blind" to parties. So there can be no negotiating. Now, for example, Intelligent Greens will vote for some Democrats, as well as some greens. And intelligent Democrats will vote for some Greens, as well as some Democrats. So some Democrats and/or some greens will undoubtedly get a very high percentage of the maximum possible vote. Given a modicum of intelligence on the part of the voters, some Republicans would possibly get up to 40% of the maximum possible vote, supposing that Democrats could muster, say, 35%, and Greens held, say, 25% of the maximum possible vote. Now, the eight candidates who garner the most votes get to go to a second round.

The second round is, again, an approval contest between the eight remaining contenders. No negotiation between parties is allowed. Each voter can give exactly one vote to each of the eight remaining contenders that she or he "approves of" (finds acceptable). Once again the votes are added up, and the two candidates who have received the most votes go to the final round.