Copeland's method: Difference between revisions
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== Criteria ==
The reasoning for why Copeland's method is Smith-efficient is as follows: every candidate in the [[Smith set]] has a pairwise victory over every candidate not in the Smith set by definition, and at most has a pairwise defeat against all but one candidate other than themselves in the Smith set, which is reduced to no pairwise defeats when the Smith set has fewer than 3 candidates (since, they can't be pairwise defeated by themselves, and if they had a pairwise defeat against all candidates other than themselves in the Smith set, then they themselves would not be in the Smith set by definition, and when there are fewer than 3 Smith candidates, either there is only one Smith candidate, who thus can't be beaten by anyone, or 2 Smith candidates, who must pairwise tie each other), so all candidates in the Smith set have a Copeland score of at least (NS - S + 1), fully written out as ((number of candidates not in the Smith set) - ((number of candidates in the Smith set) - 1). Every candidate not in the Smith set has a pairwise defeat against every candidate in the Smith set by definition, and can at most have pairwise victories against every candidate other than themselves not in the Smith set, thus their Copeland score can at most be (NS - S - 1), which is ((number of candidates not in the Smith set) - 1) - (number of candidates in Smith set). Thus, the members of the Smith set will always have a Copeland score at least 2 points higher than the candidates not in the Smith set.
Copeland's method also passes [[ISDA]];
The Copeland ranking of candidates (the ordering of candidates based on Copeland score) is a [[Smith set ranking]]. This is because in general, a candidate in the n-th Smith set (if n is 1, this is the Smith set. If n is 2, this is the secondary Smith set, which is the set of candidates that would be in the Smith set if all the candidates in the Smith set were eliminated from the election. If n is 3, this is the tertiary Smith set, the set of candidates that would be in the Smith set ignoring all candidates in the Smith set and secondary Smith set, etc.) will have pairwise victories against at least all candidates in k-th Smith sets (for any value of k which is greater than n), and have pairwise defeats against at most all candidates in j-th Smith sets (for any non-negative value of j which is smaller than n) and all but two candidates in the n-th Smith set, which reduces to no defeats against any candidates in the n-th Smith set when the n-th Smith set is smaller than 3 candidates (since they can't be beaten by themselves, and must not be beaten by everyone else in their Smith set in order to be in it, and there are guaranteed to be no pairwise defeats for Smith candidates when the Smith set is one or two candidates large), while a candidate in any k-th Smith set will have pairwise victories against at most all candidates other than themselves in k-th Smith sets, and will have pairwise defeats against at least all candidates in n-th or j-th Smith sets. Mathematically, this can be represented as
(Example showing Smith members having only 2 points more than non-Smith members: Suppose there are two candidates, one of whom is the Condorcet winner, and thus the only candidate in the Smith set. The CW has one victory and no defeats for a Copeland score of 1, while the other candidate has no victories and one defeat for a score of -1.)
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