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Descending Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions
→Properties
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DSC fails the [[Condorcet criterion]] and [[Smith set|Smith criterion]].
DSC can be considered a [[Plurality voting|First-Preference Plurality]] variant that satisfies Clone Independence. It (along with [[DAC]]) is the most complicated method satisfying the [[Participation criterion]].
===Example===
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The sets have the following strengths:
42 {M,N
42 {M
26 {N
15 {C}<br>
{N,C,K} is the strongest set that excludes a candidate. Memphis becomes ineligible.
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Notice that more than half of the votes held Memphis to be the worst alternative, yet the Memphis supporters' votes were still useful in securing their second choice, Nashville. If the Memphis voters had not listed any preferences after Memphis, the winner would have been Chattanooga.
Since DSC satisfies [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]], it's not possible for a voter to get a better result by withholding lower preferences.
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