Endorse/Accept/Reject voting: Difference between revisions

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Voters “Endorse”, “Accept”, or “Reject” each candidate. The winner is the most-endorsed candidate who isn’t “overwhelmed”“vanquished”. ATo see if a potential winner is “overwhelmed”“vanquished”, ifyou theregive arethem one point for each voter who didn't reject them, while other candidates only get points fewerfor voters who don’t reject them and also didn't rate them below the potential winner,. thanIf votersthe whopotential don’twinner rejectdoesn't somehave otherthe candidatehighest whilepoints, alsothey ratingare them"vanquished", atso leastyou asmove highon to the next-most-endorsed candidate as the new potential winner.
 
(Note: there will always be at least one candidate who is not overwhelmedunvanquished, because you always count at least as many votes for a candidate when you’re considering them as a potential winner as when you’re seeing if they overwhelmvanquish another candidate.)
 
== Criteria compliances ==
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Jaguar has the next most endorsements. They get 35 points for endorsements and 25 for acceptances; still 60. Bulldog also keeps the same total of 40. But Leopard now only gets 25 points for endorsements; Leopard's acceptances don't count now, because those voters endorsed Jaguar, the potential winner. So Jaguar wins with a score of 60 to Leopard's 25 and Bulldog's 40.
 
It is possible for Leopard voters to change this result by strategic voting if they unanimously reject Jaguar. But at least 80% of thatthe Leopard faction would have to participate in that strategic voting for it to succeed; while it would take only 58% of the Jaguar faction to defend against this strategy by rejecting Leopard. Thus, in this election, strategic voting would probably not get off the ground.
 
=== Tennessee example ("center squeeze") ===
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Unlike the other example above, this result is a [[strong Nash equilibrium]]; that is, no faction or group of factions could get a result they prefer through strategic voting.
 
[[Category:Graded Bucklin systemsmethods]]