Endorse/Accept/Reject voting: Difference between revisions

Endorse/Accept/Reject voting (view source)

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Revision as of 21:08, 9 December 2016 (view source) imported>Homunq No edit summary ← Older edit		Latest revision as of 13:13, 2 September 2018 (view source) Psephomancy (talk \| contribs) (Category:Graded Bucklin systems → Category:Graded Bucklin methods)
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Line 17: Jaguar has the next most endorsements. They get 35 points for endorsements and 25 for acceptances; still 60. Bulldog also keeps the same total of 40. But Leopard now only gets 25 points for endorsements; Leopard's acceptances don't count now, because those voters endorsed Jaguar, the potential winner. So Jaguar wins with a score of 60 to Leopard's 25 and Bulldog's 40. It is possible for Leopard voters to change this result by strategic voting if they unanimously reject Jaguar. But at least 80% of ~~that~~the Leopard faction would have to participate in that strategic voting for it to succeed; while it would take only 58% of the Jaguar faction to defend against this strategy by rejecting Leopard. Thus, in this election, strategic voting would probably not get off the ground. === Tennessee example ("center squeeze") === Line 70: Unlike the other example above, this result is a [[strong Nash equilibrium]]; that is, no faction or group of factions could get a result they prefer through strategic voting. [[Category:Graded Bucklin ~~systems~~methods]]