Improved Condorcet Approval: Difference between revisions
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'''Improved Condorcet Approval''' or '''ICA''' or '''tCA''' is a variant of [[Condorcet//Approval]] devised by [[Kevin Venzke]] which preserves [[approval voting]]'s compliance with the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion|favorite betrayal criterion]]. It uses the [[tied at the top]] rule. It satisfies [[Condorcet criterion|majority-strength Condorcet]], but not the full [[Condorcet criterion]] which also requires relative-majority Condorcet.
==Definition==
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The definitions can only differ in practice when there are more than three candidates (unless it is allowed to approve all the candidates).
== Notes ==
As formulated, ICA fails [[Cloneproof|clone independence]] (though it is likely not too difficult to modify it to satisfy the criterion).{{Clarify|reason=How?|date=April 2024}} Example:<blockquote>3 A
1 B1>B2>B3
1 B2>B3>B1
1 B3>B1>B2</blockquote>B1, B2, and B3 all have a pairwise defeat (they are in a cycle with each other), so A is elected for being an unbeaten candidate. But if B2 and B3 drop out:<blockquote>3 A
3 B1</blockquote>Now both A and B1 pairwise tie, and thus each has a 50% chance of winning.
==Links==
*[http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-May/
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
[[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]
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