Improved Condorcet Approval: Difference between revisions

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Line 1: '''Improved Condorcet Approval''' or '''ICA''' or '''tCA''' is a variant of [[Condorcet//Approval]] ~~(which~~devised ~~is not an actual~~by [[~~Condorcet~~Kevin ~~method~~Venzke]]~~) devised by Kevin Venzke~~ which preserves [[approval voting]]'s compliance with the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion\|favorite betrayal criterion]]. It uses the [[tied at the top]] rule. It satisfies [[Condorcet criterion\|majority-strength Condorcet]], but not the full [[Condorcet criterion]] which also requires relative-majority Condorcet. ==Definition== Line 56: The definitions can only differ in practice when there are more than three candidates (unless it is allowed to approve all the candidates). == Notes == As formulated, ICA fails [[Cloneproof\|clone independence]] (though it is likely not too difficult to modify it to satisfy the criterion).{{Clarify\|reason=How?\|date=April 2024}} Example:<blockquote>3 A 1 B1>B2>B3 1 B2>B3>B1 1 B3>B1>B2</blockquote>B1, B2, and B3 all have a pairwise defeat (they are in a cycle with each other), so A is elected for being an unbeaten candidate. But if B2 and B3 drop out:<blockquote>3 A 3 B1</blockquote>Now both A and B1 pairwise tie, and thus each has a 50% chance of winning. ==Links== Line 61 ⟶ 72: [[Category:Single-winner voting methods]] [[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]