Later-no-harm criterion: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
(The Condorcet criterion is incompatible with LNH, so it can't be equated 100% with majoritarianism.) |
No edit summary |
||
Line 8:
<p>'''Later-no-harm''' is incompatible with the [[Condorcet Criterion|Condorcet criterion]].</p>
<p>Example:</p>
<p>46 A>B</p>
<p>10 B</p>
<p>44 C>B</p>
<p>B is the [[Condorcet winner]], and would win in any [[Condorcet method]], and if using a [[rated method]], would win if given a high enough rating by all voters. But if the A-top voters [[Bullet voting|bullet vote]], then they can make A the winner in several voting methods, such as most [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods|Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] and likely in the rated methods. However, notice that to pass LNH in this situation, the majority of voters who [[Pairwise beat|prefer]] B over A have to have their preferences ignored; in a method like [[IRV]], that means that the C-top voters may have to choose between supporting C or using [[Favorite Betrayal]] to help B win. Essentially, passing LNH ensures voters never have to worry about their later preferences hurting them, but it can at times force them to lie about their higher preferences.</p>
<h4 class=left>Commentary</h4>
| |||