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MSDSV: Difference between revisions
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imported>Homunq (Created page with "Here's the email which introduced the idea of MSDSV, majority score declared strategy voting: == Motivation == I've been thinking about strategic rules of thumb in majority s...") |
imported>Homunq |
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But still, it's a top-shelf system from a theoretical angle, IMO. It doesn't have [[SODA]]'s "strong delegated equilibrium for a delegatable weakly semi-honest majority Condorcet winner" property, which helps with the chicken dilemma; but really all that property is saying is that SODA removes the possibility for CD offensive strategy by forcing the CD threat candidate (what we've conventionally called candidate C) to declare a strict preference between the subfactions (conventionally, A and B), and if lazy voters will then delegate to C then offensive strategy won't work. Aside from that, which is, now that I put it that way, somewhat of a cheap trick, I think MSDSV is the best system I know of for dealing with both center squeeze and CD well.
Here's my "ideal characteristics" for a political single-winner election system, more or less in descending order of importance:
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