Majority Acceptable Score voting: Difference between revisions

no edit summary
imported>Homunq
(→‎An example: strategy)
imported>Homunq
No edit summary
Line 1:
Majority Acceptable Score voting works as described below. Technically speaking, it's the [[graded Bucklin]] method which uses [[3 grade levels]] and breaks median ties using [[Score voting]].
 
* Voters ratecan candidatesgive each candidate 0, 1, or 2 points.
* AnyAll candidatecandidates ratedgiven 0 by a majority isare eliminated, if any others would remain.
** (If there are any candidates ratedgiven 2 by a majority, you should eliminate any who aren't. But a majority-2 candidate would probably win in the next step anyway, so this step is probably superfluous. It's just included because it's part of Bucklin voting, which was used in over a dozen US cities, and thus it gives this method a stronger pedigree.)
* Then the points are added up for theThe remaining candidates,candidate andwith the highest points wins.
 
Blank votes are counted as ratings of 1 or 0 points in proportion to the fraction of all voters who gave the candidate a 2. For example, a candidate could not win with more than 71% blank votes, because even if the other 29% are all 2-ratings, that would leave 71%*71%=50.41% 0-votes, enough to eliminate.
 
Here's a google spreadsheet to calculate results: [https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1siFG6XmOZokygY-86EhAKgv8YwzKtTET6AJopyXRqu0/edit#gid=0]. On page 1, it has some examples of how different combinations of ratings would come out, suggesting that it could work well in both [[chicken dilemma]] and [[center squeeze]] scenarios. On page 2, it has some hypothetical results for the Egypt 2012 election, showing that this system could have elected a reformer over Morsi, despite vote-splitting among the various reformers. IRV could have elected Morsi.
Anonymous user