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Majority Acceptable Score voting: Difference between revisions
2/3 rule
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Majority Acceptable Score voting works as described below. Technically speaking, it's the [[graded Bucklin]] method which uses [[3 grade levels]] and breaks median ties using [[Score voting]].
# Voters can
# a. If there are any candidates
#* b. (
# Give remaining candidates 2 points for each voter who supports them, and 1 point for each who accepts them (or every three who leave them blank).
# Highest points wins.
Step 2b probably doesn't matter, because any majority-
Here's a google spreadsheet to calculate results: [https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1siFG6XmOZokygY-86EhAKgv8YwzKtTET6AJopyXRqu0/edit#gid=0]. On page 1, it has some examples of how different combinations of ratings would come out, suggesting that it could work well in both [[chicken dilemma]] and [[center squeeze]] scenarios. On page 2, it has some hypothetical results for the Egypt 2012 election, showing that this system could have elected a reformer over Morsi, despite vote-splitting among the various reformers. IRV could have elected Morsi. (Note: the spreadsheet does not actually check step 2b.)
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Then, to find the second winner, if the first-time winner got 1/3 or more of 2's, first downweight those ballots as if you'd eliminated enough of them to make up 1/3 of the electorate. Otherwise, discard all of the ballots which gave the first-time winner a 2. After downweighting or discarding, run MAS normally.
If all the candidates in the first round got a majority of 0's, then you can still find two finalists as explained above. But the voters have sent a
== Relationship to NOTA ==
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{{Tenn_voting_example}}
Assume voters in each city give their own city 2; any city within 100 miles, 1; any city
<div class="floatright">
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!City
!2's
!
!
!blanks
!
!score
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