Majority Approval Voting: Difference between revisions

For a strategic voter, the most important ratings are the top ("A"), second-to-bottom ("D"), and bottom ("F"). A typical zero-knowledge strategy would be to give the best 30% of candidates an "A", the next 25% a "D", and the bottom 45% an "F". If the typical "honest" voter roughly calibrates their grades to an academic curve, with a median vote at "B" or "C", then strategic and honest votes will mesh well. For instance, if voterscandidates arelie normally distributed alongon a onetwo-dimensional spectrum of ideology and quality, and candidatesvoters lieare onnormally distributed along a twoone-dimensional spectrum of ideology and(with all voters preferring highest quality), then this system will tend to elect the candidate "closest"preferred toby the median voter, that is, the one with the smallest sum of quality deficit plus ideological skew; and this tendency will hold for any unbiased combination of "honest" and "strategic" voters as defined above.