Majority Approval Voting: Difference between revisions

For a strategic voter, the most important ratings are the top ("A"), second-to-bottom ("D"), and bottom ("F"). A typical zero-knowledge strategy would be to give candidates in the best 30% of the quality range an "A", those in the next 25% a "D", and those in the bottom 45% an "F". If the typical "honest" voter roughly calibrates their grades to an academic curve, with a median vote at "B" or "C", then strategic and honest votes will mesh well. For instance, if candidates can differ on two dimensions, ideology and quality, and voters are normally distributed along the one dimension of ideology (with all voters preferring highest quality), then this system will tend to elect the candidate preferred by the median voter, that is, the one with the smallest sum of quality deficit plus ideological skew; and this tendency will hold for any unbiased combination of "honest" and "strategic" voters as defined above.

[[Category:Graded Bucklin methods]]