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Majority Choice Approval: Difference between revisions
→Criteria compliance
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None of the methods satisfy [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]].
All of the methods are [[Summability criterion|matrix-summable]] for counting at the precinct level. Only MCA-IR actually requires a matrix - that is, "summability for k=2" (or, possibly two counting rounds); the others require only O(N) tallies, and are thus "summable for k=1".
Thus, the method which satisfies the most criteria is MCA-AR, using [[Schulze]] over the ballots to select one finalist and MCA-P to select the other. Also notable are MCA-M and MCA-P, which, as rated methods (and thus ones which fail Arrow's ranking-based Universality Criterion), are able to seem to "violate [[Arrow's Theorem]]" by simultaneously satisfying monotonicity and [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] (as well as of course sovereignty and non-dictatorship).
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