Anonymous user
Majority Choice Approval: Difference between revisions
→Criteria compliance
imported>Homunq |
imported>Homunq |
||
Line 43:
All of the methods are [[Summability criterion|matrix-summable]] for counting at the precinct level. Only MCA-IR actually requires a matrix (or, possibly two counting rounds), and is thus "[[Summability criterion|summable for k=2]]" ; the others require only O(N) tallies, and are thus "[[Summability criterion|summable for k=1]]".
Thus, the method which satisfies the most criteria is MCA-AR, using [[Schulze]] over the ballots to select one finalist and MCA-P to select the other. Also notable are MCA-M and MCA-P, which, as ''rated'' methods (and thus ones which fail Arrow's ''ranking''-based Universality Criterion), are able to seem to "violate [[Arrow's Theorem]]" by simultaneously satisfying monotonicity and [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] (as well as of course sovereignty and non-dictatorship).
== An example ==
| |||