Majority Choice Approval: Difference between revisions

imported>Homunq
imported>Homunq
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* [[Strategic nomination|Clone Independence]] is satisfied by most MCA versions. In fact, even the stronger [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]] is satisfied by MCA-A, MCA-P, MCA-M, and MCA-S. Clone independence is satisfied along with the weaker and related [[ISDA]] by MCA-IR and MCA-AR, if ISDA-compliant Condorcet methods (ie, [[Schulze]]) are used to choose the two "finalists". Using simpler methods (such as MCA itself) to decide the finalists, MCA-IR and MCA-AR are not strictly clone independent.
 
* The [[Condorcet criterion]] is satisfied by MCA-IR if the [[pairwise champion]] (PC, aka CW) is visible on the ballots and would beat at least one other candidate by an absolute majority. It is satisfied by MCA-AR if at least half the voters at least approve the PC in the first round of voting. These methods also satisfy the [[Strategy-Free criterion]] if an SFC-compliant method such as [[Schulze]] is used to pick at least one of the finalists. All other MCA versions, however, fail the Condorcet and strategy-free criteria.
 
* The [[Later-no-help criterion]] and the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] are satisfied by MCA-P. They're also satisfied by MCA-AR if MCA-P is used to pick the two finalists.
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