Majority criterion: Difference between revisions

 
(10 intermediate revisions by 4 users not shown)
Line 1:
{{wikipedia|Majority criterion}}
 
The '''majority criterion''' is a criterion for evaluating [[voting system]]s. It can be most simply thought of as "if a majority prefers a candidate as their unique 1st choice (i.e. they prefer this candidate above all other candidates), then the majority's 1st choice must win."
 
Line 9 ⟶ 11:
{{Definition| If one candidate is preferred by a majority (more than 50%) of voters, then that candidate must win}}
 
<br />
The [[mutual majority criterion]], which is sometimes simply called the majority criterion, generalizes the constraint to sets of candidates.
 
== Example: ==
The [[Condorcet criterion]] implies the majority criterion. Practically every serious ranked voting method passes the majority criterion.
<blockquote>51 A
 
Example:
<blockquote>
51 A
 
25 B>C
 
24 C>B</blockquote>51 voters out of 100 prefer A over all others (B and C), therefore A must win by the majority criterion.
24 C>B
</blockquote>
 
== Complying methods ==
51 voters out of 100 prefer A over all others (B and C), therefore A must win by the majority criterion.
Practically every serious ranked voting method passes the majority criterion, with the notable exception of [[Borda]].
 
== MajorityRelated criterionforms forof ratedthe ballotscriterion ==
There are some Cardinal systems which are designed to fulfil Majoritarianism not Utilitarianism. The majority criterion for rated ballots is a weaker, separate criterion which says that a candidate given a perfect (maximal) rating by a majority of voters must win if no other candidate received a perfect rating from that majority.
 
=== Stronger forms ===
The difference between the two versions can be seen with this example:<blockquote>51 A:1
 
The [[mutual majority criterion]], which is sometimes simply called the majority criterion, generalizes the constraint to sets of candidates.
49 B:5</blockquote>If the highest score is a 5, then the majority criterion for rated ballots allows either A or B to win. This is in contrast to the regular majority criterion, which requires A to win. Arguably, the majority criterion for rated ballots is more appropriate in the context of rated ballots, since a voter who doesn't give their 1st choice a perfect score is essentially choosing not to use all of their voting power, and thus their preference need not be (or even perhaps, shouldn't) be maximally respected or enforced.   
 
The [[Condorcet criterion]] implies the majority criterion. Practically every serious ranked voting method passes the majority criterion. 
== Comparison to Utilitarian systems==
 
=== Weaker forms of the criterion ===
[[Utilitarian winner | Utilitarian]] systems have a different intent when choosing a winner. Under the philosophy of utilitarianism, choosing a majoritarian winner when a [[Utilitarian winner]] is available would be considered bad. Majoritarianism is viewed as an approximation of Utilitarianism.
 
The [[informed majority coalition criterion]] is a weaker form of the majority criterion that only requires that a majority be able to force their first choice to win by coordinating and voting strategically. Most [[rated method]]s pass this criterion.
All utilitarian systems are [[Cardinal voting]] methods because other ballot structures do not contain enough informaiton. All such systems fail the majority criterion by design. Common examples of such as [[Approval voting|Approval]], [[Score]], and [[STAR voting]]. Following from Utilitarian theory it is argued that the [[Utilitarian winner]] is preferred in situations where they are well-liked by all voters rather than a candidate who is narrowly preferred by a majority but loathed by the minority.
 
Note that it is not always the case that the majority will have the ability to safely vote strategically if they're unsure how the other voters are going to vote, or they don't agree on a common best candidate.
Note that a utilitarian winner need not have significantly more utility than the majoritarian winner to win, nor need satisfy significantly more people. See [[Smith//Score#Notes]] for some ideas on mixing the two philosophies.
 
==== Majority criterion for rated ballots ====
There are some Cardinal systems which are designed to fulfil Majoritarianism not Utilitarianism. The majority criterion for rated ballots is a weaker, separate criterion which says that a candidate given a perfect (maximal) rating by a majority of voters must win if no other candidate received a perfect rating from that majority.
 
The difference between the two versions can be seen with this example:<blockquote>51 A:1
<br />
 
== Notes ==
49 B:5</blockquote>If the highest score is a 5, then the majority criterion for rated ballots allows either A or B to win. This is in contrast to the regular majority criterion, which requires A to win. Arguably, the majority criterion for rated ballots is more appropriate in the context of rated ballots, since a voter who doesn't give their 1st choice a perfect score is essentially choosing not to use all of their voting power, and thus their preference need not be (or even perhaps, shouldn't) be maximally respected or enforced.   
 
== Notes ==
 
For both the majority and [[Mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]], the size of the majority may either be an absolute majority of all voters, or an absolute majority of voters who have any preference between the candidates, depending on how it's defined. For example:
 
<blockquote>
Line 62 ⟶ 64:
The very minimum a voting method must do in order to be considered "majoritarian" is to pass the majority criterion for at least the two-candidate case.
 
=== Independence of irrelevant alternatives ===
Some voting methods (most [[Rated voting|rated voting]] methods) pass a weaker form of the majority criterion, which only requires that a majority be able to force their 1st choice to win by voting strategically. Note that it is not always the case that the majority will have the ability to safely vote strategically I.e. if they're unsure as to whether there is or who their collective 1st choice is.
The majority criterion implies failure of the [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]] criterion; see the [[Condorcet paradox]] for an example.
 
 
== Majority rule as an approximation of utilitarianism ==
== Utilitarian critique of majoritarianism ==
(This critique can be found at https://forum.electionscience.org/t/utilitarian-vs-majoritarian-in-single-winner/602)
 
It is important to emphasize that majoritarianism and cardinal [[utilitarianism]] are not opposing principles. Majoritarianism can be understood as an approximation of utilitarian principles under certain conservative assumptions.
An illustrative [[Score|score votingexample]] for 100 voters with candidates A, B, C ,D is <blockquote>20 = A:5, B:2, C:2, D:0
 
Within a theoretical framework using strictly ranked preferences (ordinal utilities), as in many models in modern neoclassical economics, all one can hope to achieve from a collection of social preferences is what is referred to as a ''[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency Pareto equilibrium]'': a situation where no individual can be better off without making at least one individual worse off. This concept is used, for example, to establish the Pareto equilibrium within free markets and their usage of available resources. For a given set of individual preferences many such Pareto equilibria may exist, forming what it is called a ''Pareto frontier''.
20 = A:2, B:5, C:2, D:0
 
However, Pareto equilibria by themselves can be arbitrarily anti-democratic. As an extreme example, an authoritarian dictatorship where the dictator holds all the power and wealth, and the rest of the population has none, is a perfectly legitimate Pareto equilibrium. In order to improve the lot of everyone else with the exception of the dictator, the social choice function has to violate the preferences the dictator has to remain wealthy and in power. That is, the social choice function must necessarily use some additional criterion to navigate the Pareto frontier (violating at least one individual's preferences) in order to reach an equilibrium that is perceived as "socially better". Under strict ordinal utilities there is no way to distinguish between any equilibrium in the frontier, all are equally "good", so there is no way to determine a "better" one.
20 = A:2, B:2, C:5, D:0
 
Majority rule is introduced in order to make this additional distinction between social states. It is used to justify the violation of preferences of a minority (like the sole dictator) in order to pursue a "better" equilibrium (the majority of the population).
40 = A:0, B:0, C:0, D:5</blockquote>D is the score winner with 200 and all others have 180. D is the [[Utilitarian winner]] because they yield the most Utility. If only A and D were running the ballots would likely be.<blockquote>60 = A:5, D:0
 
However, the notion of "counting" preferences does not exist under a strict ranked preference mathematical framework. "Counting", be it with integers or real numbers, is inherently a cardinal procedure.
40 = A:0, D:5</blockquote>Under Majoritarianism A would win so it looks as if B and C are spoilers for A. Systems which pass the [[Majority criteria]], like [[Instant-runoff voting|IRV]], would yield either A, B or C as the winner in the original case. Utilitarian philosophy would not view that B and C are spoilers for A. Score relies on there being enough candidates to properly get utilities. In the absence of a representative sample of candidates score would yield the majoritarian winner A. This does not mean that score gives the correct answer in the case of less candidates but that it does not work as intended because the voters do not have enough choice. It is important to then note that partisanship is fundamentally incompatible with score. If there is no party to put up candidates for a significant portion of the voters then score will not yield accurate utilities. In party based systems there are never parties for all groups. Majoritarian systems are in this way more compatible with partisanship which is why collectivists have always favoured majoritarian solutions and individualists favour utilitarian solutions.
 
In order to invoke majority rule an assumption must be made that is inherently cardinally utilitarian: that satisfying each individual's preference has the same ''cardinal utility'' gain for every person, and that these utilities can be aggregated and totals compared. Framed differently, every individual's A>B preference can exactly cancel (it's commensurable) to any other individual's B>A preference, that is, every individual has exactly the same right to violate every other individual's preferences.
Of course one could strategically vote under score and give<blockquote>20 = A:5, B:5, C:5, D:0
 
This is fundamentally a cardinal utility procedure, and in the case of two options immediately produces majority rule as a result of maximization of utility: if between any two options, A and B, one has 60% of people preferring A>B and 40% preferring B>A, then the net utility of A will be 60 - 40 = +20 against the net utility of B, 40 - 60 = -20. So a maximization of social utility chooses A, favoring the majority.
20 = A:5, B:5, C:5, D:0
 
Thus, all ranked systems can be seen as approximations of cardinal utilitarianism to various extents, and operate under the same core assumption of democracy as cardinal voting methods: that every individual has some fundamentally commensurable value that may be counted, and that the preferences of one individual can override the preferences of any other. (Whether there are different strengths of preference is irrelevant.)
20 = A:5, B:5, C:5, D:0
 
Condorcet voting systems, by applying majority rule to all pairwise comparisons, are effectively looking for the most consistently approximately utilitarian candidate. This intuitively explains the better utilitarian performance of Condorcet systems under various numerical simulations.
40 = A:0, B:0, C:0, D:5</blockquote>But this would not really happen if you look at it from a game theory perspective. The voters who favour A,B and C are in competition and are actually not so ideologically aligned. In the end some might give a little more and this might be enough to win in this scenario. For this reason some advocate that Approval Voting is the appropriate system because it forces voters into the Nash Equilibrium.
 
Another game theory perspective to consider is that elections do not exist in a vacuum. Utilitarianism leads to an equilibrium where more candidates run who are centrist to try to find the right balance to please the most. Majoritarianism leads to tyranny of the majority. Polling data does not show that voters are divided ideologically into incompatible factions. Ideologically people are Gaussian distributed around the center.
[[Category:Voting theory]]
[[Category:Majority–minority relations]]