Majority criterion: Difference between revisions
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See the [[mutual majority criterion#Notes]] article for an example where a candidate preferred by a [[plurality]] of voters as their 1st choice who [[pairwise counting|pairwise beat]] all other candidates wasn't guaranteed to win under the majority criterion. The [[Condorcet criterion]] guarantees the election of such a candidate, by virtue of them pairwise beating all others.
The very minimum a voting method must do in order to be considered "majoritarian" is to pass the majority criterion for at least the two-candidate case.
Some voting methods (most [[Rated voting|rated voting]] methods) pass a weaker form of the majority criterion, which only requires that a majority be able to force their 1st choice to win by voting strategically. Note that it is not always the case that the majority will have the ability to safely vote strategically I.e. if they're unsure as to whether there is or who their collective 1st choice is.
[[Category:Voting theory]]
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