Majority criterion: Difference between revisions
It is called "majority criterion for rated ballots" on Wikipedia, so please explain your reasoning for the name change. Also, I've moved most of your opinion piece to the bottom of the page.
Dr. Edmonds (talk | contribs) (Make it less of a stub) |
(It is called "majority criterion for rated ballots" on Wikipedia, so please explain your reasoning for the name change. Also, I've moved most of your opinion piece to the bottom of the page.) |
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51 voters out of 100 prefer A over all others (B and C), therefore A must win by the majority criterion.
There are some Cardinal systems which are designed to fulfil Majoritarianism not Utilitarianism. The majority criterion for rated ballots is a weaker, separate criterion which says that a candidate given a perfect (maximal) rating by a majority of voters must win if no other candidate received a perfect rating from that majority.
The difference between the two versions can be seen with this example:<blockquote>51 A:1▼
49 B:5</blockquote>If the highest score is a 5, then the majority criterion for rated ballots allows either A or B to win. This is in contrast to the regular majority criterion, which requires A to win. Arguably, the majority criterion for rated ballots is more appropriate in the context of rated ballots, since a voter who doesn't give their 1st choice a perfect score is essentially choosing not to use all of their voting power, and thus their preference need not be (or even perhaps, shouldn't) be maximally respected or enforced.
== Comparison to Utilitarian systems==
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All utilitarian systems are [[Cardinal voting]] methods because other ballot structures do not contain enough informaiton. All such systems fail the majority criterion by design. Common examples of such as [[Approval voting|Approval]], [[Score]], and [[STAR voting]]. Following from Utilitarian theory it is argued that the [[Utilitarian winner]] is preferred in situations where they are well-liked by all voters rather than a candidate who is narrowly preferred by a majority but loathed by the minority.
== Notes ==▼
An illustrative [[Score | score voting]]example for 100 voters with candidates A, B, C ,D is▼
20 = A:5, B:2, C:2, D:0▼
For both the majority and [[Mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]], the size of the majority may either be an absolute majority of all voters, or an absolute majority of voters who have any preference between the candidates, depending on how it's defined. For example: ▼
20 = A:2, B:5, C:2, D:0▼
20 = A:2, B:2, C:5, D:0▼
D is the score winner with 200 and all others have 180. D is the [[Utilitarian winner]] because they yield the most Utility. If only A and D were running the ballots would likely be.▼
<blockquote>
30 A>B ▼
20 B>A ▼
5 C>A ▼
50 A=B=C
Under Majoritarianism A would win so it looks as if B and C are spoilers for A. Systems which pass the [[Majority criteria]], like [[Instant-runoff voting | IRV]], would yield either A, B or C as the winner in the original case. Utilitarian philosophy would not view that B and C are spoilers for A. Score relies on there being enough candidates to properly get utilities. In the absence of a representative sample of candidates score would yield the majoritarian winner A. This does not mean that score gives the correct answer in the case of less candidates but that it does not work as intended because the voters do not have enough choice. It is important to then note that partisanship is fundamentally incompatible with score. If there is no party to put up candidates for a significant portion of the voters then score will not yield accurate utilities. In party based systems there are never parties for all groups. Majoritarian systems are in this way more compatible with partisanship which is why collectivists have always favoured majoritarian solutions and individualists favour utilitarian solutions.▼
Of course one could strategically vote under score and give▼
</blockquote>
A is the 1st choice of the majority of voters who have any preference between the three candidates, but not a majority of all voters. ▼
But this would not really happen if you look at it from a game theory perspective. The voters who favour A,B and C are in competition and are actually not so ideologically aligned. In the end some might give a little more and this might be enough to win in this scenario. For this reason some advocate that Approval Voting is the appropriate system because it forces voters into the Nash Equilibrium. ▼
See the [[mutual majority criterion#Notes]] article for an example where a candidate preferred by a [[plurality]] of voters as their 1st choice who [[pairwise counting|pairwise beat]] all other candidates wasn't guaranteed to win under the majority criterion. The [[Condorcet criterion]] guarantees the election of such a candidate, by virtue of them pairwise beating all others. ▼
Another game theory perspective to consider is that elections do not exist in a vacuum. Utilitarianism leads to an equilibrium where more candidates run who are centrist to try to find the right balance to please the most. Majoritarianism leads to tyranny of the majority. Polling data does not show that voters are divided ideologically into incompatible factions. Ideologically people are Gaussian distributed around the center.▼
The very minimum a voting method must do in order to be considered "majoritarian" is to pass the majority criterion for at least the two-candidate case. ▼
▲== Majority criterion for Cardinal ballots ==
▲There are some Cardinal systems which are designed to fulfil Majoritarianism not Utilitarianism. The majority criterion for rated ballots is a weaker, separate criterion which says that a candidate given a perfect (maximal) rating by a majority of voters must win if no other candidate received a perfect rating from that majority.
Some voting methods (most [[Rated voting|rated voting]] methods) pass a weaker form of the majority criterion, which only requires that a majority be able to force their 1st choice to win by voting strategically. Note that it is not always the case that the majority will have the ability to safely vote strategically I.e. if they're unsure as to whether there is or who their collective 1st choice is. ▼
▲The difference between the two versions can be seen with this example:
== Utilitarian critique of majoritarianism ==
(This critique can be found at https://forum.electionscience.org/t/utilitarian-vs-majoritarian-in-single-winner/602)
▲An illustrative [[Score
▲If the highest score is a 5, then the majority criterion for rated ballots allows either A or B to win. This is in contrast to the regular majority criterion, which requires A to win. Arguably, the majority criterion for rated ballots is more appropriate in the context of rated ballots, since a voter who doesn't give their 1st choice a perfect score is essentially choosing not to use all of their voting power, and thus their preference need not be (or even perhaps, shouldn't) be maximally respected or enforced.
▲== Notes ==
▲For both the majority and [[Mutual majority criterion|mutual majority criterion]], the size of the majority may either be an absolute majority of all voters, or an absolute majority of voters who have any preference between the candidates, depending on how it's defined. For example:
▲40 = A:0, B:0, C:0, D:5</blockquote>D is the score winner with 200 and all others have 180. D is the [[Utilitarian winner]] because they yield the most Utility. If only A and D were running the ballots would likely be.<blockquote>60 = A:5, D:0
▲30 A>B
▲40 = A:0, D:5</blockquote>Under Majoritarianism A would win so it looks as if B and C are spoilers for A. Systems which pass the [[Majority criteria]], like [[Instant-runoff voting
▲20 B>A
▲Of course one could strategically vote under score and give<blockquote>20 = A:5, B:5, C:5, D:0
▲5 C>A
▲A is the 1st choice of the majority of voters who have any preference between the three candidates, but not a majority of all voters.
▲40 = A:0, B:0, C:0, D:5</blockquote>But this would not really happen if you look at it from a game theory perspective. The voters who favour A,B and C are in competition and are actually not so ideologically aligned. In the end some might give a little more and this might be enough to win in this scenario. For this reason some advocate that Approval Voting is the appropriate system because it forces voters into the Nash Equilibrium.
▲See the [[mutual majority criterion#Notes]] article for an example where a candidate preferred by a [[plurality]] of voters as their 1st choice who [[pairwise counting|pairwise beat]] all other candidates wasn't guaranteed to win under the majority criterion. The [[Condorcet criterion]] guarantees the election of such a candidate, by virtue of them pairwise beating all others.
▲The very minimum a voting method must do in order to be considered "majoritarian" is to pass the majority criterion for at least the two-candidate case.
▲Some voting methods (most [[Rated voting|rated voting]] methods) pass a weaker form of the majority criterion, which only requires that a majority be able to force their 1st choice to win by voting strategically. Note that it is not always the case that the majority will have the ability to safely vote strategically I.e. if they're unsure as to whether there is or who their collective 1st choice is.
▲Another game theory perspective to consider is that elections do not exist in a vacuum. Utilitarianism leads to an equilibrium where more candidates run who are centrist to try to find the right balance to please the most. Majoritarianism leads to tyranny of the majority. Polling data does not show that voters are divided ideologically into incompatible factions. Ideologically people are Gaussian distributed around the center.
[[Category:Voting theory]]
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