Majority score voting: Difference between revisions

imported>Homunq
 
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* It fails the [[participation criterion]] but passes the [[semi-honest participation criterion]].
 
* It fails the [[Strategy-free criterion]], but, as shown in the center squeeze examplesscenario below, in a 3-candidate scenario it does at least offer viable strategies to each of the subgroups of the majority that prefers X>Y, such that anyeither subgroupof the potentially-strategic subgroups has a strategy to ensure Y loses, even if the other potentially-strategic subgroup does not maximally cooperate. ("Subgroup" in this sense is characterized by whether they prefer Z over or under both. The assumption is that the "honest" vote is Support, Accept, Reject in some order for the three candidates, or only Support and Reject in case of indifference between two of them. This guarantees that any X>Z>Y voters will maximally cooperate under honesty, so this subgroup is not potentially-strategic.)
 
It fails the [[consistency criterion]], the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], [[reversibility]], the [[majority loser criterion]], and the [[later-no-harm criterion]].
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As discussed in the above section, if all the candidates in the first round got a majority "reject", then the voters have sent a message that none of the candidates are good, akin to a result of "[[none of the above]]" (NOTA). Majority score still gives a winner, but it might be good to have a rule to limit the chance that such a winner would remain in office for multiple terms. This could either be a hard term limit, so that such a winner could only legally serve one term; or perhaps a softer rule that if they run for the same office again, the information of what percent of voters had rejected them should be next to their name on the ballot.
 
[[Category:Graded Bucklin systemsmethods]]