Maximum Majority Voting: Difference between revisions

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Imagine an election for the capital of [[Tennessee]], a state in the United States that is over 500 miles east-to-west, and only 110 miles north-to-south. Let's say the candidates for the capital are Memphis (on the far west end), Nashville (in the center), Chattanooga (129 miles southeast of Nashville), and Knoxville (on the far east side, 114 northeast of Chattanooga). Here's the population breakdown by metro area (surrounding county):
<div style="float:right; padding:2px; text-align:center">[[File:TennesseeMMV.png]]</div>
[[Image:CondorcetTennesee.png]]</div>
 
* Memphis (Shelby County): 826,330
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Let's say that in the vote, the voters vote based on geographic proximity. Assuming that the population distribution of the rest of Tennessee follows from those population centers, one could easily envision an election where the percentages of votes would be as follows:
 
<table class="wikitable" border="1">
<tr>
<td>
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First, list every pair, and determine the winner:
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
!Pair!!Winner
|-
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Thus, the pairs from above would be sorted this way:
 
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
!Pair!!Winner
|-
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=== Ambiguity resolution example ===
 
Let's say there was an ambiguity. For a simple situation involving canidatescandidates A, B, and C.
 
* A > B 72%
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* Lock A > B
* Lock B > C
* We elimateeliminate the final C > A as it creates an ambiguity or cycle.
 
Therefore, A is the winner.
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This would be true for any [[Condorcet method]].
Using the [[first-past-the-post]] system and some other systems, Memphis would have won the election by having the most people, even though Nashville won every simulated pairwise election outright. Using [[Instant-runoff voting]] in this example would result in Knoxville winning, even though more people preferred Nashville over Knoxville.
 
== Notes ==
MMV has similarities to [[Copeland's method]].
 
MMV is [[Smith-efficient]]. This is because all candidates in the Smith set pairwise beat all candidates not in the Smith set, meaning that there can't be any [[Condorcet cycle|Condorcet cycles]] involving candidate(s) in the Smith set and candidates not in the Smith set. Therefore, at worst, all candidates in the Smith set will have at least (number of candidates not in the Smith set) pairwise victories, whereas all candidates not in the Smith set will have at most ((number of candidates not in the Smith set) - 1) victories, since they can't beat anyone in the Smith set, and can't beat themselves. Therefore, Smith set members will always have more pairwise victories, and thus beat, all candidates not in the Smith set.
 
MMV passes [[ISDA]]. This is because adding or removing candidates not in the Smith set can only increase or decrease every candidate in the Smith set's number of pairwise victories correspondingly, and since Smith set members can't be in cycles with non-Smith set members, there is no way for one Smith member's number of victories to increase or decrease any more than another's when running MMV.
 
== External resources ==
* [http://radicalcentrism.org/majority_voting.htmlresources/maximum-majority-voting/ Maximum Majority Voting]
 
 
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[[Category:Defeat-dropping Condorcet methodmethods]]
[[Category:Smith-efficient Condorcet methods]]