Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions

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Category:Graded Bucklin systems → Category:Graded Bucklin methods

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Revision as of 13:33, 16 November 2016 (view source) imported>Homunq (→‎Logic for 25%-preferred threshold (step 2)) ← Older edit		Latest revision as of 13:13, 2 September 2018 (view source) Psephomancy (talk \| contribs) (Category:Graded Bucklin systems → Category:Graded Bucklin methods)
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Line 6: # If the frontrunner still has the most points, they win. Otherwise, the winner is the candidate with fewest "Reject" ratings. To express it in a single sentence: if the most-preferred non-majority-rejected candidate, X, has more non-reject votes than any other candidate has non-reject votes that ~~don~~aren't ~~beat~~below X, then X wins; otherwise, the least-rejected candidate wins. Note that the procedure above will always elect a candidate with no more than 50% "Reject", if any exist. This is because, if any exist, one of them will be the frontrunner, and they will thus score points equal to at least 50% of the voters. Line 45: * 40: C>B None are majority-rejected, and C is the frontrunner. Points are: A, 60; B, 55; C, 55; X, 35. A wins. However, if 611 of the last group of voters strategically betrayed their true favorite C, the situation would be as follows: * 30: AX>B (That is, on 35 ballots, A and X are preferred, B is accepted, and C is rejected) Line 51: * 15: B>A * 10: B>AC * 3429: C>B * 611: B Now, C is not viable with 51% rejection; so B is the leader. Since C is no longer the leader, B gets the 34 points from C voters, and wins. The strategy succeeded; the strategic voters are better off. Line 125: [[Category:Graded Bucklin ~~systems~~methods]]