Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions

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* 40: C>B
 
None are majority-rejected, and C is the frontrunner. Points are: A, 60; B, 55; C, 55; X, 35. A wins. However, if 611 of the last group of voters strategically betrayed their true favorite C, the situation would be as follows:
 
* 30: AX>B (That is, on 35 ballots, A and X are preferred, B is accepted, and C is rejected)
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* 15: B>A
* 10: B>AC
* 3429: C>B
* 611: B
 
Now, C is not viable with 51% rejection; so B is the leader. Since C is no longer the leader, B gets the 34 points from C voters, and wins. The strategy succeeded; the strategic voters are better off.
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[[Category:Graded Bucklin systemsmethods]]