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Prefer Accept Reject voting: Difference between revisions
→Favorite betrayal?
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PAR voting fails the [[favorite betrayal criterion]] (FBC). For instance, consider the following "non-disqualifying center-squeeze" scenario: (
* 30: AX>B (That is, on 35 ballots, A and X are preferred, B is accepted, and C is rejected)
* 35: AX>B▼
*
* 10: B>AC
* 40: C>B
None are disqualified,
* 30: AX>B (That is, on 35 ballots, A and X are preferred, B is accepted, and C is rejected)
*
*
* 10: B>AC
*
*
Now,
However, there are several ways to "rescue" FBC-like behavior for this system.
For one, we could add a "
For another, we could restrict the domain to voting scenarios which meet the following restrictions:
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If the above restrictions hold, then PAR voting would meet FBC. It is arguably likely that real-world voting scenarios will meet the above restrictions, except for a negligible fraction of "ideologically atypical" voters. For instance, in the first scenario above, the categories appear to be {XA}, {B}, and {C}, so the B>AC voters would probably actually vote either B>A or B>C.
And finally, note that in any scenario where it fails that for some small group, there is a rational strategy for some superset of that group which does not involve betrayal. For instance, in first scenario above, if
== An example ==
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