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For one, we could add a "stand aside" option to the ballot, as described in [[FBPPAR]].
For another, wethe B>AC voters could restrictsimply reject C, the domainstrongest torival votingof scenariostheir whichfavorite, meetand theB would win with no need followingfor restrictions:betrayal.
# Each candidate either comes from one of no more than 3 "ideological categories", or is "nonviable".
# No "nonviable" candidate is preferred by more than 25%.
# Each voter rejects at least one of the 3 "ideological categories" (that is, rejects all candidates in that category) and does not reject at least one of them (rejects none of the candidates in that category).
# There are no honest Condorcet cycles.
If the above restrictions hold, then PAR voting would meet FBC. It is arguably likely that real-world voting scenarios will meet the above restrictions, except for a negligible fraction of "ideologically atypical" voters. For instance, in the first scenario above, the categories appear to be {XA}, {B}, and {C}, so the B>AC voters would probably actually vote either B>A or B>C.
And finally, note that in any scenario where it fails that for some small group, there is a rational strategy for some superset of that group which does not involve betrayal. For instance, in first scenario above, if 16 of the C>B voters switch to CB, then B is the leader and wins without them having to rate C below their true feelings.
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