Preferential voting: Difference between revisions
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==Parliamentary procedure==
Recent editions of [[Robert's Rules of Order]] mention preferential voting. The book notes, "While it is more complicated than other methods of voting in common use and is not a substitute for the normal procedure of repeated balloting until a majority is obtained, preferential voting is especially fair and useful in an election by mail if it is impractical to take more than one ballot" (RONR [10th ed.], p. 411, l. 23). Rather than discuss Condorcet, the Borda count, and other lesser-known variations, the book simply states, "Preferential voting has many variations. One method is described here by way of illustration," and proceeds with a description of instant runoff voting.
== Notes ==
[[Approval voting]] can be thought of as a special case of a ranked method where voters are constrained to ranking all candidates either 1st or last (this requires allowing equal-rankings). [[Score voting]] can be understood in the ranked context by first turning the Score ballots into Approval ballots using the [[KP transform]]. It can be of interest to observe what a ranked voting method looks like in its "approval case" (when all voters rank in a way that can be converted into an Approval ballot i.e. rank 1st or last). For example, all [[Smith-efficient]] [[Condorcet methods]] become [[Approval voting]] in their approval case. It has not been investigated very far as to what the approval case of several ranked [[PR]] methods looks like: for something like [[Schulze STV]], it is very likely that it reduces to some other [[:Category:Approval PR methods|Approval PR]] method, or that its approval case is an interesting new Approval PR method.
Interesting hybrids of [[Rated method|rated methods]] and ranked methods can be thought of when allowing the voter to establish how strong their preference is between each ranking. Rankings generally assume a voter has a maximally strong preference between every pair of candidates they indicate any preference between, while ratings assume a voter's preference in one [[head-to-head matchup]] directly influences their preference in another i.e. a voter who votes, with the max score of 5 and the min score of 0, A:5 B:0, is assumed to have no preference between B and C. This can be bridged between by allowing the voter to indicate independently how strong their preference is in each head-to-head matchup; see [[Order theory#Strength of preference]].
[[Category:Ballot type]]
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