Preferential voting: Difference between revisions

(wording and formatting)
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* Use fractional votes. If N candidates are tied on a ballot, each candidate receives 1/N of a first-place vote, 1/N of a second-place vote, etc.
* In most [[Condorcet methods]], the [[defeat strength]] of X over Y can be computed from the X>Y and Y>X votes, while simply ignoring X=Y votes.
 
For Condorcet methods, the first approach (random tie-breaking) results in the same results in the head-to-head matchups between the tied candidates with probability approaching 1 if many voters do it, and there are only 2 tied candidates. For example, if 100 voters use a 50% probability of ranking one over the other and a 50% probability of the vice versa, then there will be 50 voters preferring one and 50 voters preferring the other in their head-to-head matchup, resulting in no change in the margin between the two. Note that this will change the defeat strength as measured by winning votes or possibly other measures, though; for example, if a candidate had a 2 to 1 (66.66% majority) victory over someone else, and 100 votes are added on both sides, this becomes closer to a 50.1% majority victory.
 
==Scope for corruption==