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'''Proportional representation''' ('''PR''') characterizes [[electoral system]]s in which divisions in an electorate are reflected proportionately in the elected body.<ref name=JSM7>{{cite book|last1=Mill|first1=John Stuart|author-link=John Stuart Mill|title=Considerations on Representative Government|chapter=Chapter VII, Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only |chapter-url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5669/5669-h/5669-h.htm#link2HCH0007 |year=1861 |publisher=Parker, Son, & Bourn |location=London|title-link=Considerations on Representative Government}}</ref> The most widely used families of "proportional representation" electoral systems are [[party-list proportional representation|party-list PR]], [[mixed-member proportional representation]] (MMP), and the [[single transferable vote]] (STV).<ref name="DouglasHowPrElecWork">{{cite web|last=Amy|first=Douglas J|title=How Proportional Representation Elections Work |url=http://www.fairvote.org/how_proportional_representation_elections_work |publisher=[[FairVote]]| access-date=26 October 2017}}</ref>
 
'''Proportional[[Voting Representation'''theorists]] ('''PR''')frequently isdebate which systems can be called "proportional representation", and consider the levels of proportionality achieved by various systems from "low proportional" to "high proportional". The concept of "proportional representation" can be quantified as a measure of the outcome of an election where there are multiple parties and multiple membermembers are electionelected, and the representatives are demographically similar to the voting population. It is one of many [[types of representation]] in a [[W:Representative Governmentgovernment|representative government]].
 
The [[Partisan system|partisan]] definition for "proportional representation" is that the candidates are partitioned into disjoint parties, and each voter approves all candidates in a single party. For example,<ref>{{Cite book|last=Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0qY8DwAAQBAJ&q=multiwinner++voting+a+new+challenge&pg=PA27|title=Trends in Computational Social Choice|date=2017-10-26|publisher=Lulu.com|isbn=978-1-326-91209-3|editor-last=Endriss|editor-first=Ulle|language=en|chapter=Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory}}</ref> suppose we need to elect a committee of size 10. Suppose that exactly 50% of the voters approve all candidates in party A, exactly 30% approve all candidates in party B, and exactly 20% approve all candidates in party C. Then, proportional representation requires that the committee contains exactly 5 candidates from party A, exactly 3 candidates from party B, and exactly 2 candidates from party C. If the fractions are not exact, then some rounding method should be used, and this can be done by various [[Apportionment (politics)|apportionment methods]]. However, in approval voting there is a different challenge: the voters' approval sets might not be disjoint. For example, a voter might approve one candidate from party A, two candidates from B, and five from C. This raises the question of how proportional representation should be defined. The concepts of "[[justified representation]]" one approach to solving this problem.
In practice this usually involves ensuring that [[political party|political parties]] in parliament or legislative assemblies receive a number of seats (approximately) proportional to the percentage of vote they received through a [[Partisan System]]. The simplest system which achieves high levels of Proportional Representation is the [[Party List System| party-list proportional representation]]. Another kind of electoral system that strives to achieve proportional representation but which does not rely on the existence of political parties is the [[single transferable vote]] (STV). Some electoral systems, such as the [[single non-transferable vote]] and [[cumulative voting]] are sometimes categorized as "semi-proportional".
 
== Usage ==
 
Typically in the countries that use "high proportional" systems, there are more than two large political parties, and representatives will be chosen from many different parties. When the majority of voters favor one party, that party usually forms the government in parliamentary systems. Otherwise the government that is formed will usually have members of more than one party.
 
Countries which use systems designed to achieve high proportional representation include:
* [[Africa]]: [[South Africa]]
* [[Asia]]: [[Israel]], [[Russia]], [[South Korea]], [[Sri Lanka]], and [[Turkey]].
* [[Europe]]: [[Austria]], [[Belgium]], [[Bulgaria]], [[Czech Republic]], [[Denmark]], [[Estonia]], [[Finland]], [[Greece]], [[Iceland]], [[Ireland]], [[Netherlands]], [[Norway]], [[Poland]], [[Portugal]], [[Romania]], [[Spain]], [[Sweden]], and [[Switzerland]]
* [[South America]]: [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]],
 
Countries which have semi-proportional representation systems include: [[Australia]], [[Germany]], [[Hungary]], [[India]], [[Republic of Ireland]], [[Italy]], [[Japan]], [[Mexico]], [[New Zealand]], [[Thailand]] and [[Wales]]. [[India]] is perhaps the largest democracy which uses a form of proportional representation.
 
Similar principles apply to sub-regions, who may have their own parliament or assembly. For example, in [[W:Scotland|Scotland]], after the passage of the [[W:Local Governance (Scotland) Act 2004|Local Governance (Scotland) Act 2004]], the Scottish portion of the [[United Kingdom]] uses [[single transferable vote]] to select many of their local representatives.
 
== Measures ==
 
In practice, the implementation of "proportional representation" involves ensuring that [[W:Political party|political parties]] in parliament or legislative assemblies receive a number of seats (approximately) proportional to the percentage of the vote they received by making use of a [[Partisan systems|partisan system]]. One system which achieves high levels of proportional representation is [[party-list proportional representation]]. Another kind of electoral system strives to achieve proportional representation, but without relying on the existence of political parties. A common example of this is the [[single transferable vote]] (STV).
There are several metrics which are used to define Proportional Representation explicitly. The most well accepted is the [[Gallagher index]]. As such, it measures the difference between the percentage of votes each party gets and the percentage of seats each party gets in the resulting legislature, and it also measures this disproportionality from all parties ''collectively'' in any one given election. That collective disproportionality from the election is given a precise score, which can then be used in comparing various levels of proportionality among various elections from various [[electoral systems]].
 
There are several metrics that are used to define proportionality of election methods explicitly.
 
=== Gallagher index ===
[[Michael Gallagher (academic)|Michael Gallagher]], who created the index, referred to it as a "least squares index", inspired by the residual sum of squares used in the method of least squares. The index is therefore commonly abbreviated as "LSq" even though the measured allocation is not necessarily a least squares fit. The Gallagher index is computed by taking the [[square root]] of half the [[summation|sum]] of the squares of the difference between percent of votes (<math>V_i</math>) and percent of seats (<math>S_i</math>) for each of the political parties (<math>i=1,\ldots,n</math>).
One well-accepted measure of proportionality is the [[W:Gallagher index|Gallagher index]], which measures the difference between the percentage of votes each party gets and the percentage of seats each party gets in the resulting legislature, and aggregates across all parties to give a total measure in any one given election result. This measure attributes a specific level or [[Proportional Representation]] to a given election which can then be used in comparing various levels of proportionality among various elections from various [[Voting system]]s.
: <math>\mathrm{LSq} = \sqrt{ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n ( V_i-S_i ) ^2}</math>&nbsp;&nbsp;{{sfn|Gallagher|1991|p=40}}
 
[[W:Michael Gallagher (academic)|Michael Gallagher]], who created the index, referred to it as a "least squares index", inspired by the residual sum of squares used in the method of least squares. The index is therefore commonly abbreviated as "LSq" even though the measured allocation is not necessarily a least squares fit. The Gallagher index is computed by taking the [[W:Square root|square root]] of half the [[W:Summation|sum]] of the squares of the difference between percent of votes (<math>V_i</math>) and percent of seats (<math>S_i</math>) for each of the political parties (<math>i=1,\ldots,n</math>).
The index weighs the deviations by their own value, creating a responsive index, ranging from 0 to 100. The larger the differences between the percentage of the votes and the percentage of seats summed over all parties, the larger the Gallagher index. The larger the index value the larger the disproportionality and vice versa. Michael Gallagher included "other" parties as a whole category, and [[Arend Lijphart]] modified it, excluding those parties. Unlike the well-known [[Loosemore–Hanby index]], the Gallagher index is less sensitive to small discrepancies.
:<math>\mathrm{LSq} = \sqrt{ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n ( V_i-S_i ) ^2}</math>&nbsp;&nbsp;{{sfn|Gallagher|1991|p=40}}
 
The index weighs the deviations by their own value, creating a responsive index, ranging from 0 to 100. The larger the differences between the percentage of the votes and the percentage of seats summed over all parties, the larger the Gallagher index. The larger the index value, the larger the disproportionality, and vice versa. Michael Gallagher included "other" parties as a whole category, and [[Arend Lijphart]] modified it, excluding those parties. Unlike the well-known [[Loosemore–Hanby index]], the Gallagher index is less sensitive to small discrepancies.
 
The whileWhile the [[Gallagher index]] is considered the standard measure for [[Proportional Representation]], Gallagher himself considered the [[Sainte-Laguë method]] "probably the soundest of all the measures." This is closely related to the Pearson's chi-squared test which has better statistical underpinning.
 
:<math>\mathrm{SLI} = \sum {(S-V)^2 \over V}</math>
 
=== Lack of nonpartisan measures ===
The failing of all such measures is the assumption that each vote is cast for one political party. This means that the only system which can be used in [[Partisan systems]]. Under the assumption that a [[plurality vote]] for a candidate represents a vote for their party, these meausres can be applied to plurality voting systems like [[Single Member Plurality]] and [[Mixed Member Proportional]]. The consequence of this limitation is that Proportional Representation is not defined for systems without vote splitting.
The failing of all such measures is the assumption that each vote is cast for one political party. This means that the only system which can be used is a [[Partisan system]]. Under the assumption that [[Plurality Voting]] for a candidate represents a vote for their party, these measures can be applied to plurality voting systems like [[Single Member Plurality]] and [[Mixed-Member Proportional]]. In addition, if it is assumed that when some voters rank every candidate in a party ahead of all other candidates, that they prefer that party, then [[PSC]] and [[:Category:PSC-compliant voting methods | PSC-compliant voting methods]] can be used to measure how well ranked and rated PR methods satisfy partisan proportionality. The consequence of this limitation is that Proportional Representation is not defined for systems without [[vote splitting]].
 
The reliance of the standard definition of Proportional representation on the system being [[Partisan system | Partisan]] is clearly limiting on the usefulness of such a definition. A [[Partisan system]] itself has long been considered a flaw which undermines the [[Ideal Representation]] of the individual. <ref>See {{Cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |author-link=John Stuart Mill|year=1861 |editor-last= |editor-first= |contribution= |title= Considerations on Representative Government |edition=1 |publisher= Parker, Son, & Bourn |publication-date=1861 |location=London |url=https://archive.org/details/considerationso04millgoog |accessdate=20 June 2014 }} via Google Books</ref><ref>See {{Cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |author-link=John Stuart Mill|year=1873 |editor-last= |editor-first= |contribution= |title= Considerations on Representative Government |edition=1 |publisher= Henry Holt & Company |publication-date=1873 |location=New York |url=https://archive.org/details/considerations00mill |accessdate=20 June 2014 }} via archive.org</ref> If Proportional Representation cannot be robustly defined in a non-partisan system then it is of little use.
 
== Proportional Representation Criteria==
 
Since the standard definitions of Proportional Representation do not apply to nearly all modern systems it has become common to define proportional representation in terms of passing some sort of criteria. There is no consensus on which criteria need to be passed for a parliament to be said to be proportional, though most can agree that a voting method that passes one of the [[weak forms of PSC]] (several of which are listed here) is at least semi-proportional. It is worth noting that because there are disagreements on how best to conceptualize of PR, some measures look at how much each voter likes their favorite candidate i.e. the one meant to "represent them" (such as [[Monroe's method]]) while others look at how satisfied each voter is with all of the elected representatives.
 
===Proportional (Ideological)Proportionality Representationfor Solid Coalitions Criterion ===
{{main|Proportionality for Solid Coalitions}}
 
''Proportionality for Solid Coalitions'' is often abbreviated as "PSC". The definition: if a sufficiently-sized group (generally at least a Droop or Hare quota) prefer a set of candidates above all others, do at least a proportional number (being the number of quotas the group comprises rounded down to the nearest integer) of candidates from that set (supposing there are enough of them) get elected?
Whenever a group of voters gives max support their favoured candidates and min support to every other candidate, at least one seat less than the portion of seats in that district corresponding to the portion of seats that that group makes up is expected to be won by those candidates.
 
===Proportional (Ideological) Representation Criterion===
 
Whenever a group of voters gives max support to their favoured candidates and min support to every other candidate, at least one seat less than the portion of seats in that district corresponding to the portion of seats that that group makes up{{clarify}} is expected to be won by those candidates.
One of the effects of this property is that if all voters vote solely on party lines (max support to everyone in your party and min support to everyone outside of it), then the proportion of popular vote for candidates associated to parties is roughly equal to the proportion of members elected for each party. This is identical to “Partisan Proportionality” in the case that all groups large enough to expect a winning candidate have a party which they identify with and their candidate belongs to.
 
One of the effects of this property is that if all voters vote solely on party lines (max support to everyone in your party and min support to everyone outside of it), then the proportion of popular vote for candidates associated to parties is roughly equal to the proportion of members elected for each party. This is a weak form of PSC identical to “Partisan Proportionality” in the case that all groups large enough to expect a winning candidate have a party which they identify with and their candidate belongs to.
 
===Partisan Proportionality Criterion===
 
How similar are the proportion of the voters who support a party to the proportion of the parliament when voters deploy the strategy that maximizes the number of seats their preferred party gets (in most methods, this strategy is voting solely on party lines, i.e. max support to everyone in your party and min support to everyone outside of it).? This is a calculation for a specific outcome of a specific election. There are multiple different methods to be used but the most common is the Gallagher index. Specific systems can be judged under such metrics by the average expected value. This metric is nearly an exact restatement of the concept of Proportional Representation and as such, it cannot be defined in many cases.
 
===Hare Quota Criterion===
 
Whenever more than a [[Hare Quota]] of the voters gives max support to a single candidate and min support to every other candidate, that candidate is guaranteed to win regardless of how any of the other voters vote. This is explicitly formalized for approval ballots as [[Justified_representation#Proportional_justified_representation | Proportional justified representation ]].
 
Any method that passes the Proportional Representation Criterion also passes the Hare Quota Criterion.
 
===Winner Independent Proportionality Criterion===
Line 48 ⟶ 72:
===Combined Independent Proportionality Criterion===
 
The winner set must be proportional even if some losing candidates were disqualified, scores for some losing candidates were reduced, and/or the scores for some winning candidates were increased. That is, if at least n quotas of ballots approve the same set of candidates, but there is partial disagreement on some candidates outside of that set, m of whom were elected, then at least n-m candidates in the set must be elected. (If 2 quotas approve ABCD, 2 quotas approve ABCDE, the standard PR criterion would require 2 of ABCD to be elected, whereas this criterion would require 4 of ABCDE to be elected.) These last two criteria are related to PSC.
 
== Proportional Systems ==
Line 55 ⟶ 79:
 
# The metric for proportionality must be defined and the winner selection defined under those terms
# There is a clear relationrelationship between the vote and the endorsement for a single party
 
This means that only [[Partisan Systems]] can be exactly proportional. Conversely, noall systemsystems hashave nosome level of Proportional Representation since metrics like [[Gallagher index]] never reach theythe maximum values. The criteria above are often used to define proportionality for modern systems like [[ReweightedSequentially RangeSpent VotingScore]] or [[Sequential proportional approval voting]]. The most common being Hare Quota Criterion. These are normally implementsimplemented as a number of multi-member districts whichthat together form a parliament. Each district produces results guaranteed to pass the Hare Quota Criterion.
 
The district magnitude of a system (i.e. the number of seats in a constituency) plays a vital role in determining how proportional an electoral system can be. When using such systems, the greater the number of seats in a district or constituency, the more Proportional Representation it will achieve.
 
However, multiple-member districts do not need to use a system whichthat passes any of these proportionality criteria. For example, a [[bloc vote]] would not pass any of the criteria.
 
An interesting quirk for implementation is that many [[Partisan Systems]] are altered in order to remove representation from groups. For example, in a [[Party List]] system it is common to putadd a capthreshold, that a party needs some percent of votes to receive any seats. The effect of this is that the major parties receive relatively relatively equitable results but the fringe parties receive none.
 
===Semi-proportional Systems===
==Advocacy==
 
A "semi-proportional" system is made of several [[Regional Systems | regional]] [[Multi-Member Districts]] with each passing some measure of [[Proportional Representation]]. While each district is in itself going to produce results with High Proportional Representation, the assembly as a whole will not. For larger parties, the results will tend to be fairly high in proportional representation because the variation from each district is averaged out over the group. For smaller parties, there is a threshold for entry so they may receive no seats. This is normally viewed as a positive feature since partisan systems often impose such a threshold to keep out small extremist groups.
Proportional representation is unfamiliar to most citizens of the United States. There are many organizations who campaign for Proportional Representation but they often use the term loosly and use it to refer to systems. Such campaigns have use advocacy for the poorly defined term "proportional system" in order to gain support. The dominant system in former British colonies was [[Single Member Plurality] but [[mixed member system]] and [Single Transferable Vote]] replaced it in a number of such places.
 
Semi-Proportional systems can be constructed from any multi-winner system. However, they are typically done with sequential non-partisan systems, such as the [[single transferable vote]] and [[Reweighted score voting]]. The most common criticism of such systems have to do with inequalities that arise from the difference in population densities. Having a 5 member district in a sparsely populated rural area would imply that the district be much larger than similar districts in cities. To avoid this it is sometimes proposed that rural areas have single member district while cities have multi-member districts. This then results in another inequality relating to the partisan allocation of funds do to some seats being simpler to win with different systems. A good example of such failures which ultimately resulted in returning to the original system is provincial Canada.<ref>https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-single-transferable-vote-1.5271771</ref>
Proportional representation does have some history in the United States. Many cities, including New York, once used it for their city councils as a way to break up the Democratic Party monopolies on elective office. In Cincinnati, Ohio, proportional representation was adopted in 1925 to get rid of a Republican party machine (the Republicans successfully overturned proportional representation in 1957).
 
An alternative, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semi-proportional_representation#Non-partisan_systems more common] definition of semi-proportional is that a voting method must pass some weak form of [[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]] e.g. allowing voters to get PSC-like outcomes through strategic voting. Something like [[SNTV]] would classify as semi-proportional under this definition.
Some electoral systems incorporate additional features to ensure ''absolutely'' accurate or more comprehensive representation, based on gender or minority status (like ethnicity). Note that features such as this are not strictly part of proportional representation; depending on what kind of PR is used, people tend to be already represented proportionally according to these standards without such additional rules.
 
===Party list PR===
See [[two-party system#Arguments for and against|Two-Party System: Arguments For and Against]] for a list of perceived advantages of proportional representation.
{{Main|Party-list proportional representation}}
 
Party list proportional representation is an electoral system in which seats are first allocated to parties based on vote share, and then assigned to party-affiliated candidates on the parties' [[electoral list]]s. This system is used in many countries, including [[Finland]] (open list), [[Latvia]] (open list), [[Sweden]] (open list), [[Israel]] (national closed list), [[Brazil]] (open list), [[Nepal]] (closed list) as adopted in 2008 in first CA election, the [[Netherlands]] (open list), [[Russia]] (closed list), [[South Africa]] (closed list), [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]] (open list), and [[Ukraine]] (open list). For elections to the [[European Parliament]], most [[Member states of the European Union|member states]] use open lists; but most large EU countries use closed lists, so that the majority of EP seats are distributed by those.<ref>As counted from the table in http://www.wahlrecht.de/ausland/europa.htm [in German]; "Vorzugsstimme(n)" means "open list".</ref> Local lists were used to elect the [[Italian Senate]] during the second half of the 20th century.
==History of Definitions==
 
====Closed list PR====
There are two/three main competing philosophies between what is and is not proportional.
{{Main|Closed list}}
 
In closed list systems, each party lists its candidates according to the party's [[candidate selection]] process. This sets the order of candidates on the list and thus, in effect, their probability of being elected. The first candidate on a list, for example, will get the first seat that party wins. Each voter casts a vote for a list of candidates. Voters, therefore, do not have the option to express their preferences at the ballot as to which of a party's candidates are elected into office.<ref>{{cite web |title=Party List PR |url = http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/party-list|publisher=Electoral Reform Society |access-date=23 May 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Fixing Canadian Democracy |author= Gordon Gibson |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=y7hFz5GawkcC&q=closed+list+PR&pg=PA58 |publisher=The Fraser Institute |page=76 |date=2003|isbn= 9780889752016 }}</ref> A party is allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes it receives.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gallagher |first1=Michael |last2=Mitchell |first2=Paul |date=2005 |title=The Politics of Electoral Systems |location=Oxford, New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=11 |isbn=978-0-19-925756-0}}</ref>
Under the most Phragmen interpretation, voting is a balancing problem where the weights of candidates must be balanced between the different voters and the outcomes composed of candidates that best balance these weights are the most proportional.
 
There is an intermediate system in Uruguay ("[[Wikipedia:Ley de Lemas|Ley de Lemas]]"), where each party presents several closed lists, each representing a faction. Seats are distributed between parties according to the number of votes, and then between the factions within each party.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Taylor|first=Phillip B.|date=1955-02-01|title=The Electoral System in Uruguay|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/2126402|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=17|issue=1|pages=19–42|doi=10.2307/2126402|issn=0022-3816}}</ref>
Under the most Monroe interpretation, every candidate has a quota, and the more an outcome maximizes the scores voters in that candidate’s quota gives them, the more proportional the voting method is regardless of how anybody outside of that candidate’s quota rates them.
 
====Open list PR====
Under the most Thiele interpretation, every voter has an honest utility of each candidate, and even if you completely resent a candidate, it is statistically impossible for your honest utility of any individual candidate to equal 0 exactly. Under this interpretation, the more an outcome maximizes the sum among all voters: ln( the sum of utilities that voter gave to each winner ), the more proportional it is. Now obviously since while candidates can’t chose their honest utilities, they can chose the scores they give to candidates which means that it is much more likely that a candidate will give a set of candidates all zero scores which will blow up the natural log function (see footnote), so to counter-act this, the most Thiele voting methods instead use the partial sums of the harmonic function, which are closely related to the natural log (The natural log is the integral of 1/t from t=1 to t=x and the partial sums of the harmonic series are the summation of 1/n from n=1 to n=x).
{{Main|Open list}}
 
In an open list, voters may vote, depending on the model, for one person, or for two, or indicate their order of preference within the list. These votes sometimes rearrange the order of names on the party's list and thus which of its candidates are elected.
The backstory: Thiele, a danish statistician, and Phragmen, a mathematician (and yes, oddly enough Thiele was the statistician and Phragmen was the mathematician, not the other way around), have been debating these two philosophies in Sweden. Thiele originally proposed sequential proportional approval voting in 1900 and it was adopted in Sweden in 1909 before Sweden switched to party list voting afterwards in order to make the number of seats parties won match their support even more closely. Phragmen believed there was flaws in Thiele’s method, and came up with his own sequential method to correct these flaws, and that started a debate about what was the ideal metric of proportionality 6. Thiele also came up with the approval ballot version of harmonic voting, and it would take about a century for both his sequential proportional approval voting method, however during that time, the harmonic method was too computationally exhaustive to be used in a governmental election. Both his sequential proportional approval voting and his approval ballot version of the harmonic method were lost to history until about a century later when they were independently rediscovered.
 
====Local list PR====
I lumped Phragmen and Monroe together in the title, because these two philosophies share many desirable and undesirable properties: mainly a lack of convexity (i.e. the weak monotonicity described on the document), the ability for votes that give every candidate the same score to effect the outcome, this (Read the “Pereira’s Complaints about Monroe” section of Monroe’s method or the “Major defect pointed out by Toby Pereira” section of this Phragmen-Type method 2) haunting election scenario where both philosophies pick what is clearly the wrong winner, and not failing the universally liked candidate criterion 8 (which is a criterion that Thiele type methods fail).
{{Main|Localized list}}
 
In a local list system, parties divide their candidates in single member-like constituencies, which are ranked inside each general party list depending by their percentages. This method allows electors to judge every single candidate as in a [[FPTP]] system.
Benefits of the Phragmen/Monroe measure of proportionality:
 
====Two-tier party list systems====
Passes the ULC criteria 8. For Thiele-type methods, because they fail ULC, every time a candidate that every voter gave a max rating to wins, the distribution of the remaining winners becomes more majoritarian/utilitarian.
Some party list proportional systems with open lists use a two-tier compensatory system, as in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In [[Folketing#Constitutional requirements|Denmark]], for example, the country is divided into ten multiple-member voting districts arranged in three regions, electing 135 representatives. In addition, 40 compensatory seats are elected. Voters have one vote which can be cast for an individual candidate or for a party list on the district ballot. To determine district winners, candidates are apportioned their share of their party's district list vote plus their individual votes. The compensatory seats are apportioned to the regions according to the party votes aggregated nationally, and then to the districts where the compensatory representatives are determined. In the 2007 general election, the district magnitudes, including compensatory representatives, varied between 14 and 28. The basic design of the system has remained unchanged since its introduction in 1920.<ref name=denmark>{{cite web|title=The Parliamentary Electoral System in Denmark |url=http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/The%20Parliamentary%20Electoral%20System%20in%20DK.aspx|publisher=Ministry of the Interior and Health|location=Copenhagen|access-date=1 Sep 2014|date=2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The main features of the Norwegian electoral system |url=http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/kmd/information-campaigns/election_portal/the-electoral-system/the-norwegian-electoral-system.html?id=456636|publisher=Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation|location=Oslo|access-date=1 Sep 2014|date=2017-07-06}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The Swedish electoral system|url=http://www.val.se/sprak/engelska/general_information/index.html|publisher=Election Authority|location=Stockholm|access-date=1 Sep 2014|date=2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140818233057/http://www.val.se/sprak/engelska/general_information/index.html|archive-date=18 August 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref>
 
===Single transferable vote===
Benefits of the Thiele measure of proportionality:
{{Main|Single transferable vote}}
 
The single transferable vote (STV), also called ''choice voting'',<ref name=fairVoteFairRep>{{cite web |title=Fair Voting/Proportional Representation |url=http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/fair-representation-voting/ |publisher=[[FairVote]] |access-date=9 April 2014}}</ref><ref name=amyHist>{{cite web|last=Amy|first=Douglas J|title=A Brief History of Proportional Representation in the United States |url=http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=647 |publisher=[[FairVote]]|access-date=16 October 2015}}</ref> is a [[ranked voting|ranked system]]: voters rank candidates in order of preference. Voting districts usually elect three to seven representatives. The count is cyclic, electing or eliminating candidates and transferring votes until all seats are filled. A candidate is elected whose tally reaches a [[Droop quota|quota]], the minimum vote that guarantees election. The candidate's surplus votes (those in excess of the quota) are transferred to other candidates at a fraction of their value proportionate to the surplus, according to the voters' preferences. If no candidates reach the quota, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, those votes being transferred to their next preference at full value, and the count continues. There are many methods for transferring votes. Some early, manual, methods transferred surplus votes according to a randomly selected sample, or transferred only a "batch" of the surplus, other more recent methods transfer all votes at a fraction of their value (the surplus divided by the candidate's tally) but may need the use of a computer. Some methods may not produce exactly the same result when the count is repeated. There are also different ways of treating transfers to already elected or eliminated candidates, and these, too, can require a computer.<ref name=tidemanSTV>{{cite journal |last1=Tideman|first1=Nicolaus|author-link=Nicolaus Tideman|date=1995 |title=The Single Transferable Vote |journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives |volume=9 |issue=1 |doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.27 |pages=27–38|url=http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.27}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=O’Neill|first1=Jeffrey C.|date=July 2006 |title=Comments on the STV Rules Proposed by British Columbia |journal=Voting Matters |issue=22 |url = http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE22/INDEX.HTM |access-date=10 August 2013}}</ref>
Adding ballots that give every candidate the same score can’t change which outcome is considered the best.
Convexity (Defined as Warren’s weak monotonicity criteria on the document).
Weak participation (also defined on the document).
 
In effect, the method produces groups of voters of equal size that reflect the diversity of the electorate, each group having a representative the group voted for. Some 90% of voters have a representative to whom they gave their first preference. Voters can choose candidates using any criteria they wish, the proportionality is implicit.<ref name=DMstvPdf>{{cite web|last1=Mollison|first1=Denis|title=Fair votes in practice STV for Westminster|url=http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~denis/signif.pdf|publisher=[[Heriot Watt University]]|access-date=3 June 2014}}</ref> Political parties are not necessary; all other prominent PR electoral systems presume that parties reflect voters wishes, which many believe gives power to parties.<ref name=tidemanSTV/> STV satisfies the [[Comparison of electoral systems|electoral system criterion]] ''[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions|proportionality for solid coalitions]]'' – a solid coalition for a set of candidates is the group of voters that rank all those candidates above all others – and is therefore considered a system of proportional representation.<ref name=tidemanSTV/> However, the small district magnitude used in STV elections has been criticized as impairing proportionality, especially when more parties compete than there are seats available,<ref name=forder/>{{rp|50}} and STV has, for this reason, sometimes been labelled "quasi proportional".<ref name=AusOVC/>{{rp|83}} While this may be true when considering districts in isolation, results {{em|overall}} are proportional. In Ireland, with particularly small magnitudes, results are "highly proportional".<ref name=ideaEsd/>{{rp|73}}<ref name=ideaGallagher/> In the [[Wikipedia:1997 Irish general election|1997 Irish general election]], the average magnitude was 4.0 but eight parties gained representation, four of them with less than 3% of first preference votes nationally. Six independent candidates also won election.<ref name=laver/> STV has also been described as the {{em|most}} proportional system.<ref name=AusOVC/>{{rp|83}} The system tends to handicap extreme candidates because, to gain preferences and so improve their chance of election, candidates need to canvass voters beyond their own circle of supporters, and so need to moderate their views.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Referendum 2011: A look at the STV system |url=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10762976 |publisher=The New Zealand Herald |date=1 Nov 2011 |access-date=21 Nov 2014 |location=Auckland|work=[[The New Zealand Herald]] }}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |title=Change the Way We Elect? Round Two of the Debate |url=https://thetyee.ca/Views/2009/04/30/STV2/ |magazine=The Tyee |date=30 Apr 2009 |access-date=21 Nov 2014 |location=Vancouver}}</ref> Conversely, widely respected candidates can win election with relatively few first preferences by benefitting from strong subordinate preference support.<ref name=DMstvPdf/>
Criticisms of the Phragmen metric (from Warren’s Thiele vs. Phragmen debate section) 6:
 
====Australian Senate STV====
“Taken to its limits, Phragmen-thinking would say, once the 50% Reds elected a red MP, and the 50% Blues elected a blue MP, there was no benefit whatever to replacing the red MP by somebody approved by the entire populace!”
The term ''STV'' in Australia refers to the Senate electoral system, a variant of ''Hare-Clark'' characterized by the "above the line" [[group voting ticket]], a party list option. It is used in the Australian upper house, the [[Wikipedia:Australian Senate|Australian Senate]], most state upper houses, the [[Tasmania|Tasmanian]] lower house and the Capital Territory assembly. Due to the number of preferences that are compulsory if a vote for candidates (below-the-line) is to be valid – for the Senate a minimum of 90% of candidates must be scored, in 2013 in [[New South Wales]] that meant writing 99 preferences on the ballot<ref name=prsaHC/> – 95% and more of voters use the above-the-line option, making the system, in all but name, a party list system.<ref name=uwaAbove>{{cite web|title=Above the line voting |url=http://elections.uwa.edu.au/glossaryc.lasso?CondensedGlossary=abovethelinevoting |publisher=University of Western Australia |access-date=21 Nov 2014|location=Perth}}</ref><ref name=abcGlossaryGVT>{{cite web |title=Glossary of Election Terms |url=http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2010/guide/glossary.htm#group_voting_ticket |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation|access-date=21 Nov 2014|location=Sydney}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hill|first1=I.D.|date=November 2000 |title=How to ruin STV |journal=Voting Matters |issue=12 |url = http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE12/P7.htm |access-date=10 August 2013}}</ref> Parties determine the order in which candidates are elected and also control transfers to other lists and this has led to anomalies: preference deals between parties, and "micro parties" which rely entirely on these deals. Additionally, independent candidates are unelectable unless they form, or join, a group above-the-line.<ref name=anthonyGreen04>{{cite web|last=Green|first=Anthony|title=Above or below the line? Managing preference votes|url=http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=3359&page=0 |publisher=On Line Opinion|date=20 April 2005|access-date=21 Nov 2014 |location=Australia}}</ref><ref name=ersDog>{{cite web|last=Terry|first=Chris|title=Serving up a dog's breakfast|url=http://devers2.speedster-it.com/blog/serving-up-a-dogs-breakfast|publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]]|date=5 April 2012|access-date=21 Nov 2014|location=London|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007220903/http://devers2.speedster-it.com/blog/serving-up-a-dogs-breakfast|archive-date=7 October 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> Concerning the development of STV in Australia researchers have observed: "... we see real evidence of the extent to which Australian politicians, particularly at national levels, are prone to fiddle with the electoral system".<ref name=AusOVC>{{cite book|title=The Australian Electoral System: Origins, Variations, and Consequences |date=2006|publisher=[[UNSW Press]] |location=Sydney |isbn=978-0868408583 |author=David M. Farrell |author2=Ian McAllister}}</ref>{{rp|86}}
 
As a result of a parliamentary commission investigating the 2013 election, from 2016 the system has been considerably reformed (see [[Wikipedia:2016 Australian federal election|2016 Australian federal election]]), with group voting tickets (GVTs) abolished and voters no longer required to fill all boxes.
Criticisms of the Thiele metric (from Warren’s Thiele vs. Phragmen debate section) 6:
 
===Mixed compensatory systems===
“Three people share a house and two prefer apples and one prefers oranges. One of the apple-preferrers does the shopping and buys three pieces of fruit. But instead of buying two apples and an orange, he buys three apples. Why? Because they all have tap water available to them already and he took this into account in the proportional calculations. And his reasoning was that the larger faction (of two) should have twice as much as the smaller faction (of one) when everything is taken into account, not just the variables. Taken to its logical conclusion, Thiele-thinking would always award the largest faction everything because there is so much that we all share – air, water, public areas, etc!”
A mixed compensatory system is an electoral system that is [[mixed electoral system|mixed]], meaning that it combines a plurality/majority formula with a proportional formula,<ref name=ACEMixSys>{{cite web|last1=ACE Project Electoral Knowledge Network|title=Mixed Systems|url=https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd03/default|access-date=29 June 2016}}</ref> and that uses the proportional component to compensate for disproportionality caused by the plurality/majority component.<ref name=MassicotteSearch>{{cite|first1=Louis|last1=Massicotte|title=In Search of Compensatory Mixed Electoral System for Québec|url=https://www.institutions-democratiques.gouv.qc.ca/publications/mode_scrutin_rapport_en.pdf|date=2004}}</ref><ref name=BochslerTerritory>{{cite book|first1=Daniel|last1=Bochsler|title=Territory and Electoral Rules in Post-Communist Democracies|chapter=Chapter 5, How Party Systems Develop in Mixed Electoral Systems|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qkCBDAAAQBAJ|date=May 13, 2010|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=9780230281424}}</ref> For example, suppose that a party wins 10 seats based on [[plurality voting|plurality]], but requires 15 seats in total to obtain its proportional share of an elected body. A fully proportional mixed compensatory system would award this party 5 compensatory (PR) seats, raising the party's seat count from 10 to 15. The most prominent mixed compensatory system is [[mixed member proportional representation]] (MMP), used in Germany since 1949. In MMP, the seats won by plurality are associated with single-member districts.
 
====Mixed member proportional representation====
Warren also gave a defense 6 of this criticism of Thiele-type methods:
{{Main|Mixed member proportional representation}}
 
Mixed member proportional representation (MMP) is a two-tier system that combines a single-district vote, usually [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post]], with a compensatory regional or nationwide party list proportional vote. The system aims to combine the local district representation of [[FPTP]] and the proportionality of a national party list system. MMP has the potential to produce proportional or moderately proportional election outcomes, depending on a number of factors such as the ratio of FPTP seats to PR seats, the existence or nonexistence of extra compensatory seats to make up for [[overhang seat]]s, and electoral thresholds.<ref name="IfesElecSys">{{cite web |title=Electoral Systems and the Delimitation of Constituencies |url=http://www.ifes.org/publications/electoral-systems-and-delimitation-constituencies |date=2 Jul 2009 |publisher=[[International Foundation for Electoral Systems]]}}</ref><ref name="MoserMixedElec">{{cite journal |title=Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis|date=December 2004|volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=575–599|last1=Moser|first1=Robert G. |doi=10.1016/S0261-3794(03)00056-8 |journal=Electoral Studies}}</ref><ref name="MassicotteMixedElecSys">{{cite journal |title=Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey |date=September 1999 |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=341–366|last1=Massicotte|first1=Louis |doi=10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00063-8 |journal=Electoral Studies}}</ref> It was invented for the German [[Bundestag]] after the Second World War and has spread to [[Lesotho]], [[Bolivia]] and [[New Zealand]]. The system is also used for the [[Welsh Assembly|Welsh]] and [[Scottish Assembly|Scottish]] assemblies where it is called the [[additional member system]].<ref name=ersAMS/><ref name=DouglasHowPrElecWork/>
“The trouble with this is, politicians are not like tap water and oranges. That reasoning would make sense if politicians were “wholy owned” by the Blues, just as Peter wholy-eats an apple. But even the most partisan politicians in Canada do a lot of work to help Joe Average constituent whose political leanings they do not even know. At least, so I am told.”
 
Voters typically have two votes, one for their district representative and one for the party list. The list vote usually determines how many seats are allocated to each party in parliament. After the district winners have been determined, sufficient candidates from each party list are elected to "top-up" each party to the overall number of parliamentary seats due to it according to the party's overall list vote. Before apportioning list seats, all list votes for parties which failed to reach the threshold are discarded. If eliminated parties lose seats in this manner, then the seat counts for parties that achieved the threshold improve. Also, any direct seats won by independent candidates are subtracted from the parliamentary total used to apportion list seats.<ref>{{cite web|title=MMP Voting System |url=http://www.elections.org.nz/voting-system/mmp-voting-system |publisher=[[Electoral Commission (New Zealand)|Electoral Commission New Zealand]]|location=Wellington|access-date=10 Aug 2014|date=2011}}</ref>
Pick your poison: it seems that all proportional voting methods must fail one of two closely related properties:
 
The system has the potential to produce proportional results, but proportionality can be compromised if the ratio of list to district seats is too low, it may then not be possible to completely compensate district seat disproportionality. Another factor can be how [[overhang seat]]s are handled, district seats that a party wins in excess of the number due to it under the list vote. To achieve proportionality, other parties require "balance seats", increasing the size of parliament by twice the number of overhang seats, but this is not always done. Until recently, Germany increased the size of parliament by the number of overhang seats but did not use the increased size for apportioning list seats. This was changed for the 2013 national election after the constitutional court rejected the previous law, not compensating for overhang seats had resulted in a [[negative vote weight]] effect.<ref>{{cite news|title=Deutschland hat ein neues Wahlrecht |url=http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-02/bundestag-wahlrecht-beschluss |publisher=[[Zeit Online]]|language=de|date=22 February 2013}}</ref> Lesotho, Scotland and Wales do not increase the size of parliament at all, and, in 2012, a New Zealand parliamentary commission also proposed abandoning compensation for overhang seats, and so fixing the size of parliament. At the same time, it would abolish the single-seat threshold – any such seats would then be overhang seats and would otherwise have increased the size of parliament further – and reduce the electoral threshold from 5% to 4%. Proportionality would not suffer.<ref name=ideaEsd/><ref name=NZ2012EC>{{cite web|title=Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System|url=http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2012-mmp-review/results-mmp-review|publisher=[[Electoral Commission (New Zealand)|Electoral Commission New Zealand]]|location=Wellington|access-date=10 Aug 2014|date=2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140707151142/http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2012-mmp-review/results-mmp-review|archive-date=7 July 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref>
If a group of voters gives all the candidates the same score, that cannot effect the election results (ex: if you gave every candidate a max score, your vote shouldn’t change who is and isn’t a winner any more so then you would change the results by just not voting)
 
====Dual member proportional representation====
If some of the winners are given the same score by all voters, that cannot effect the proportionality of the election results among the remaining winners (ex: if you removed a candidate that is given a max score by all voters, and ran the election again such that you were electing 1 less winner, the only difference between that election result and the original election result should be that it does not contain the universally liked candidate).
{{Main|Dual member proportional representation}}
 
Dual member proportional representation (DMP) is a single-vote system that elects two representatives in every district.<ref>{{cite web|author=Sean Graham|title=Dual-Member Mixed Proportional: A New Electoral System for Canada|url=https://era.library.ualberta.ca/items/e3ab993a-d264-4d30-b819-290ab5fd6b62|date=April 4, 2016}}</ref> The first seat in each district is awarded to the candidate who wins a plurality of the votes, similar to [[first-past-the-post voting]]. The remaining seats are awarded in a compensatory manner to achieve proportionality across a larger region. DMP employs a formula similar to the "best near-winner" variant of [[mixed-member proportional representation|MMP]] used in the German state of [[Baden-Württemberg]].<ref>{{cite news|author=Antony Hodgson|title=Why a referendum on electoral reform would be undemocratic|url=https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2016/01/21/Why-Referendum-on-Electoral-Reform-Undemocratic/|work=[[The Tyee]]|date=Jan 21, 2016}}</ref> In Baden-Württemberg, compensatory seats are awarded to candidates who receive high levels of support at the district level compared with other candidates of the same party. DMP differs in that at most one candidate per district is permitted to obtain a compensatory seat. If multiple candidates contesting the same district are slated to receive one of their parties' compensatory seats, the candidate with the highest vote share is elected and the others are eliminated. DMP is similar to [[Single transferable vote|STV]] in that all elected representatives, including those who receive compensatory seats, serve their local districts. Invented in 2013 in the [[Provinces and Territories of Canada|Canadian province]] of [[Alberta]], DMP received attention on [[Prince Edward Island]] where it appeared on a [[2016 Prince Edward Island electoral reform referendum|2016 plebiscite]] as a potential replacement for [[first-past-the-post voting|FPTP]],<ref>{{cite news|author=Kerry Campbell|title=P.E.I. electoral reform committee proposes ranked ballot|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/pei-electoral-reform-1.3537355|work=[[CBC News]]|date=April 15, 2016}}</ref> but was eliminated on the third round.<ref>{{cite web|author=Elections PEI|title=Plebiscite Results|url=http://www.electionspei.ca/plebisciteresults|date=November 7, 2016|access-date=October 26, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161108134958/http://www.electionspei.ca/plebisciteresults|archive-date=November 8, 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Susan Bradley|title=P.E.I. plebiscite favours mixed member proportional representation|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/mixed-member-proportional-representation-in-plebiscite-1.3840172|work=[[CBC News]]|date=November 7, 2016}}</ref> It was also one of three proportional voting system options on a [[2018 British Columbia electoral reform referendum|2018 referendum]] in [[British Columbia]].<ref>{{cite web |first=David |last=Eby |title=How We Vote: 2018 Electoral Reform Referendum Report and Recommendations of the Attorney General |url=https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/271/2018/05/How-We-Vote-2018-Electoral-Reform-Referendum-Report-and-Recommendations-of-the-Attorney-General.pdf |date=May 30, 2018 |access-date=June 9, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180831060310/https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/271/2018/05/How-We-Vote-2018-Electoral-Reform-Referendum-Report-and-Recommendations-of-the-Attorney-General.pdf |archive-date=August 31, 2018 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |first=Justin |last=McElroy |title=Know your voting systems: three types of electoral reform on B.C.'s ballot |url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/pr-electoral-reform-questions-1.4688604?cmp=rss |work=[[CBC News]] |date=June 2, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |publisher=[[Elections BC]] |title=2018 Referendum on Electoral Reform: Voting Results Available |url=https://elections.bc.ca/news/2018-referendum-on-electoral-reform-voting-results-available/ |access-date=November 1, 2020}}</ref>
Phragmen/Monroe-type methods fail 1. and Thiele-type methods fail 2. and as of this point, it doesn’t seem possible to have them both without giving up PR.
 
===Biproportional apportionment===
I am on the Thiele side of this Thiele vs. Phragmen debate, and I believe Warren is also on this side of the debate, and that Jameson lies on the Phragmen side of this debate.
{{Main|Biproportional apportionment}}
 
Biproportional [[apportionment (politics)|apportionment]] applies a mathematical method ([[iterative proportional fitting]]) for the modification of an election result to achieve proportionality. It was proposed for elections by the mathematician [[Michel Balinski]] in 1989, and first used by the city of [[Zurich]] for its council elections in February 2006, in a modified form called "new Zurich apportionment" (''Neue Zürcher Zuteilungsverfahren''). Zurich had had to modify its party list PR system after the [[Switzerland|Swiss Federal Court]] ruled that its smallest [[Ward (electoral subdivision)|wards]], as a result of population changes over many years, unconstitutionally disadvantaged smaller political parties. With biproportional apportionment, the use of open party lists hasn't changed, but the way winning candidates are determined has. The proportion of seats due to each party is calculated according to their overall citywide vote, and then the district winners are adjusted to conform to these proportions. This means that some candidates, who would otherwise have been successful, can be denied seats in favor of initially unsuccessful candidates, in order to improve the relative proportions of their respective parties overall. This peculiarity is accepted by the Zurich electorate because the resulting city council is proportional and all votes, regardless of district magnitude, now have equal weight. The system has since been adopted by other Swiss cities and [[Cantons of Switzerland|cantons]].<ref name=pukZna>{{cite journal |ref=ZurichNA|last1=Pukelsheim|first1=Friedrich|date=September 2009|title=Zurich's New Apportionment|journal=German Research|volume=31 |issue=2 |pages=10–12|doi=10.1002/germ.200990024| url=http://www.uni-augsburg.de/pukelsheim/2008e-en.pdf |access-date=10 August 2014}}</ref><ref name=balinskiFMV>{{cite journal |ref=FMV|last1=Balinski|first1=Michel|author-link=Michel Balinski|date=February 2008|title=Fair Majority Voting (or How to Eliminate Gerrymandering)|journal=The American Mathematical Monthly|volume=115 |issue=2 |pages=97–113|doi=10.1080/00029890.2008.11920503|s2cid=1139441| url=http://www.maa.org/programs/maa-awards/writing-awards/fair-majority-voting-or-how-to-eliminate-gerrymandering |access-date=10 August 2014}}</ref>
What version of proportionality do you prefer and what reasons do you have for preferring it?
 
====Fair majority voting====
Footnote:
Balinski has proposed another variant called [[fair majority voting]] (FMV) to replace single-winner plurality/majoritarian electoral systems, in particular the system used for the [[US House of Representatives]]. FMV introduces proportionality without changing the method of voting, the number of seats, or the –possibly gerrymandered –district boundaries. Seats would be apportioned to parties in a proportional manner at the [[U.S. state|state]] level.<ref name=balinskiFMV/> In a related proposal for the [[UK parliament]], whose elections are contested by many more parties, the authors note that parameters can be tuned to adopt any degree of proportionality deemed acceptable to the electorate. In order to elect smaller parties, a number of constituencies would be awarded to candidates placed fourth or even fifth in the constituency – unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate, the authors concede – but this effect could be substantially reduced by incorporating a third, regional, apportionment tier, or by specifying minimum thresholds.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Akartunali|first1=Kerem|last2=Knight|first2=Philip A.|date=January 2014|title=Network Models and Biproportional Apportionment for Fair Seat Allocations in the UK Elections| url=http://personal.strath.ac.uk/kerem.akartunali/research/Voting_preprint.pdf |publisher=[[University of Strathclyde]]|access-date=10 August 2014}}</ref>
 
===Other proportional systems===
In addition, maximizing the natural log favors small parties a little too much to pass proportional criteria and when a voter’s satisfaction is zero is just the most extreme example of that. The partial sums of the harmonic series equation does however pass the proportional criteria that a maximization of the natural log can’t. I personally think that the partial sums of the harmonic series are better for determining the winners of an election, but the natural log of summed utilities is a better tool for measuring proportionality in computer simulations even if those simulations are skewed to representing small parties too much (which may or may not be a bad thing).
Generally, these differ from [[ranked choice voting]] by voters assigning a score instead of rank to each candidate. Each score is turned into a proportion by dividing by the sum of scores over candidates, for each position and voter (roughly similar, in effect, to each voter getting 100 percent to assign among candidates for each position).
 
====Reweighted range voting====
Reweighted range voting (RRV) is a multi-winner voting system similar to STV in that voters can express support for multiple candidates, but different in that candidates are [[Cardinal voting|graded]] instead of [[Ranked voting|ranked]].<ref name=smithMultisurv>{{cite web|last=Smith|first=Warren|title=Comparative survey of multiwinner election methods|url=http://rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/multisurv.pdf|date=18 June 2006}}</ref><ref name=kokSmithRangeWeb>{{cite web|last1=Kok|first1=Jan|last2=Smith|first2=Warren|title=Reweighted Range Voting – a Proportional Representation voting method that feels like range voting|url=http://rangevoting.org/RRV.html|access-date=4 April 2016}}</ref><ref name=ryanAssetWeb>{{cite web|last=Ryan|first=Ivan|title=Reweighted Range Voting – a Proportional Representation voting method that feels like range voting|url=http://rangevoting.org/RRVr.html|access-date=4 April 2016}}</ref> That is, a voter assigns a score to each candidate. The higher a candidate's scores, the greater the chance they will be among the winners.
 
Similar to STV, the vote counting procedure occurs in rounds. The first round of RRV is identical to [[range voting]]. All ballots are added with equal weight, and the candidate with the highest overall score is elected. In all subsequent rounds, ballots that support candidates who have already been elected are added with a reduced weight. Thus voters who support none of the winners in the early rounds are increasingly likely to elect one of their preferred candidates in a later round. The procedure has been shown to yield proportional outcomes if voters are loyal to distinct groups of candidates (e.g. political parties).<ref name=smithRange>{{cite web|last=Smith|first=Warren|title=Reweighted range voting – new multiwinner voting method|url=http://rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/rerange.pdf|date=6 August 2005}}</ref>
 
RRV was used for the nominations in the Visual Effects category for recent Academy Award Oscars from 2013 through 2017.<ref name=oscars2017Rules>{{cite web|title=89th Annual Academy Awards of Merit for Achievements during 2017|url=https://www.oscars.org/sites/oscars/files/89aa_rules.pdf|access-date=4 April 2016}}</ref><ref name=oscars2012RulesRule22>{{cite web|title=Rule Twenty-Two: Special Rules for the Visual Effects Award|url=http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/rules/rule22.html|access-date=4 April 2016|url-status=bot: unknown|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120914153856/http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/rules/rule22.html|archive-date=14 September 2012}}</ref>
 
====Proportional approval voting====
{{Main|Proportional approval voting|Sequential proportional approval voting}}
Systems can be devised that aim at proportional representation but are based on approval votes on individual candidates (not parties). Such is the idea of [[Proportional approval voting]] (PAV).<ref>{{cite arxiv|eprint=1611.08691|last1=Brill|first1=Markus|title=Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods|last2=Laslier|first2=Jean-François|last3=Skowron|first3=Piotr|class=cs.GT|year=2016}}</ref>
When there are a lot of seats to be filled, as in a legislature, counting ballots under PAV may not be feasible, so sequential variants have been proposed, such as [[Sequential proportional approval voting]] (SPAV). This method is similar to reweighted range voting in that several winners are elected using a multi-round counting procedure in which ballots supporting already elected candidates are given reduced weights. Under SPAV, however, a voter can only choose to approve or disapprove of each candidate, as in [[approval voting]]. SPAV was used briefly in Sweden during the early 1900s.<ref name="AzizGaspers2014">{{cite book |last1=Aziz |first1=Haris |author2=Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Simon Mackenzie, Nicholas Mattei, Toby Walsh |title=Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |chapter=Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting |pages=107–115 |isbn=978-1-4503-3413-6|arxiv=1407.3247v1 |year=2014 }}</ref>
 
====Asset voting====
In asset voting,<ref name=smithMultisurv/><ref name=smithAssetMultiwin>{{cite web|last=Smith|first=Warren|title="Asset voting" scheme for multiwinner elections|url=http://rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/multiwin.pdf|date=8 March 2005}}</ref> the voters vote for candidates and then the candidates negotiate amongst each other and reallocate votes amongst themselves. Asset voting was proposed by [[Lewis Carroll]] in 1884<ref>{{cite web |url=https://archive.org/details/ThePrinciplesOfParliamentaryRepresentation |title=The Principles of Parliamentary Representation |last=Dodgson |first=Charles |date=1884 |publisher=London: Harrison and Sons |access-date=28 June 2019 |quote=The Elector must understand that, in giving his vote to ''A'', he gives it to him as his absolute property, to use for himself, or to transfer to other Candidates, or to leave unused.}}</ref> and has been more recently independently rediscovered and extended by [[Warren D. Smith]] and [[Forest Simmons]].<ref name=smithAssetWeb>{{cite web|last=Smith|first=Warren|title=Asset voting – an interesting and very simple multiwinner voting system|url=http://rangevoting.org/Asset.html|access-date=4 April 2016}}</ref> As such, this method substitutes candidates' collective preferences for those of the voters.
 
====Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR)====
Similar to [[Majority Judgment]] voting that elects single winners, Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR) elects all the members of a legislative body. Both systems remove the qualitative wasting of votes.<ref>{{cite book|author= M. Balinski & R. Laraki|year=2010|title=Majority Judgment. |publisher=MIT |isbn=978-0-262-01513-4}}</ref> Each citizen grades the fitness for office of as many of the candidates as they wish as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (entirely unsuitable). Multiple candidates may be given the same grade by a voter. Using EPR, each citizen elects their representative at-large for a city council. For a large and diverse state legislature, each citizen chooses to vote through any of the districts or official electoral associations in the country. Each voter grades any number of candidates in the whole country. Each elected representative has a different voting power (a different number of weighted votes) in the legislative body. This number is equal to the total number of votes given exclusively to each member from all citizens. Each member's weighted vote results from receiving one of the following from each voter: their highest grade, highest remaining grade, or proxy vote. No citizen's vote is "[[wasted vote|wasted]]"<ref>{{cite journal |first1=Stephen |last1=Bosworth |first2=Anders |last2=Corr |first3=Stevan |last3=Leonard |name-list-style=amp |title=Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR): an Algorithm |url=http://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v2/|journal=Journal of Political Risk |volume=7 |number=8 |date=July 8, 2019 |access-date=August 19, 2019}}</ref> Unlike all the other proportional representation systems, each EPR voter, and each self-identifying minority or majority is quantitatively represented with exact proportionality. Also, like Majority Judgment, EPR reduces by almost half both the incentives and possibilities for voters to use Tactical Voting. {{See also|Tactical voting#Majority judgment}}
 
 
==Advocacy==
 
* [https://fixourhouse.org Fix Our House]
* [https://prorepcoalition.org ProRep Coalition]
* [https://fairvote.org/our-reforms/proportional-ranked-choice-voting-information/ FairVote] (predominantly for STV)
* [https://electionscience.org/learn/library/proportional-voting-methods/ Center for Election Science] (predominantly for Proportional Approval Voting)
* [https://www.equal.vote/pr Equal Vote Coalition] (predominantly for Proportional STAR)
 
Proportional representation is unfamiliar to many citizens of the United States. The dominant system in former British colonies was [[Single Member Plurality|single member plurality (SMP)]], but [[Mixed-member proportional|mixed-member proportional representation (MMP)]] and [[Single transferable vote|single transferable vote (STV)]] replaced it in a number of such places.
 
A few cities in the United States use STV, including Portland, OR, Albany, CA, Palm Desert, CA, Cambridge, MA, and [https://fairvote.org/our-reforms/proportional-ranked-choice-voting-information/ a couple of others]. Many cities in the past, including New York, also had used such systems for their city councils as a way to break up the Democratic Party monopolies on elective office. In Cincinnati, Ohio, a system was adopted in 1925 to get rid of Republican party dominance but was successfully overturned in 1957.
 
Some electoral systems incorporate additional constraints on winner selection to ensure quotas based on based on gender or minority status (like ethnicity). Note that features such as this are not typically associated with "proportional representation" although the goal of such systems is to ensure that elected member representation is proportional to such population percentages. Many proportional representation advocates argue that, voters will already be justly represented without these demographic rules since the particular immutable characteristics are independent of partisan allegiance, ideology or ability as a politician.
 
==Non-Partisan Definitions==
 
In the case of non-partisan voting, the definition of proportional Representation is undefined. Metrics like Gallagher index can no longer be defined. For non-partisan multi-member systems, for ranked methods, there is generally one minimum requirement for proportionality, [[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]] (though see the [[Monroe's method#Fully Proportional Representation with Ordinal Balloting|Monroe's method]] article for an alternative idea), while for cardinal PR methods, there are four main competing philosophies between what is and is not proportional: [[Phragmén's Method | Phragmén]], [[Monroe's method | Monroe]], Thiele and [[Vote unitarity | Unitary]]. See the [[cardinal PR]] article for more information on these.
 
===Example Systems===
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! System !! Philosophy !! Comment
|-
| [[Single transferable vote]]|| [[PSC]] or[[Monroe's method | Monroe interpretation]]|| Ordinal ballots
|-
| [[Sequential Monroe voting]]|| [[Monroe's method | Monroe interpretation]]|| -
|-
| [[Sequentially Spent Score]] || [[Vote unitarity | Unitary interpretation ]] || -
|-
| [[Sequentially Shrinking Quota]] || [[Vote unitarity | Unitary interpretation ]] || May not be strictly Unitary but follows from the theory
|-
| [[Sequential proportional approval voting]] || Thiele Interpretation || Approval ballots only
|-
| [[Reweighted Range Voting]]|| Thiele Interpretation || May not be strictly Thiele but follows from the theory
|-
| [[Single distributed vote]] || Thiele Interpretation || A more Thiele implementation of [[Reweighted Range Voting]]
|-
| [[Sequential Phragmen]] || [[Phragmén's Method | Phragmén interpretation]] ||
|-
| [[Sequential Ebert]] || [[Phragmén's Method | Phragmén interpretation]] ||
|-
|?
|[[Stable winner set]]
|Unknown whether a Hare-stable winner set always exists
|}
 
===Comparison===
 
[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]] is praised for ensuring that voters get what would intuitively be considered an at least somewhat proportional outcome, but is criticized for focusing too much on giving a voter one "best" representative, rather than letting that voter have influence in electing several representatives.
 
Many of the properties of these systems can be derived from their party list simplifications. The [[Balinski–Young theorem]] implies that not all desirable properties are possible in the same system. Theile type systems reduce to [[Highest averages method|divisor methods]] which means that adding voters or winners will not change results in undesirable ways. The other three reduce to [[Largest remainder methods]] which obey Quota Rules but adding voters or winners may change outcomes in undesirable ways. One such way is failure of [[Participation criterion]]. It is not clear which is a fundamentally better choice since Quota Rules are intimately tied with some definitions of proportionality.
 
=== Criticisms ===
Some common criticisms of [[STV]] (which would likely hold for many other nonpartisan PR methods) are that it is too complex in terms of filling out the ballot and tabulation, that it takes too long to count compared to partisan PR methods (many of which are [[precinct-summable]] due to being based on [[FPTP]]), and that it can even make representatives parochialist and focused on representing their multi-member districts rather than the state or nation as a whole. Note that this last criticism is inapplicable when nonpartisan PR methods are proposed for a single national/statewide district, though this is usually not proposed or done (with the exception of some 21-seaters in Australia).
 
== Alternatives ==
 
Due to the ambiguity and difficulty in the definition of Proportional Representation academic work often uses another more robust metric. This is the concept of a [[Stable Winner Set]]. The requirement that a system always produces a stable winner set when there exists one is definable in all possible systems. This makes it more useful than the concept of Proportional Representation which is typically tied to Partisan voting and as such cannot be defined for all systems. This concept evolved out of the economics field of [[participatory budgeting]]. A weaker version of this is given by [[justified representation]].
 
== Definitions ==
Ballot weight: The amount of power a voter's ballot has. It starts out at 1 vote, and can go down all the way until 0 i.e. if a candidate gets elected with a voter's support, then their ballot weight is reduced to allow other voters to elect someone they prefer.
 
== Notes ==
It may be desirable in some circumstances for a voting method to produce only semi-proportional outcomes. For example, the list of movie nominees for the Oscars may be improved with some diversity, but movies broadly recognized as excellent should still take priority over movies that are more polarizing. Similarly, if doing a primary election to decide which candidates should advance to the general election, it may be desirable for there to be some PR, in part to ensure more choices for the voters and to thwart large factions' attempts to pack the general election with only their side's candidates, but by and large the result should resemble a [[Bloc voting]] election. In order to do this, the best approach is often sequential: use some single-winner method to pick a best winner, then reduce the power of the voters who supported that winner and repeat until all seats are filled. For example, one could create a voting method in between [[RRV]] and [[Score voting]] by reducing the amount of ballot weight RRV takes from each voter in each round. See [[Condorcet PR]] for ideas on this with [[Condorcet methods]].
 
=== Party list case ===
The party list case of a proportional voting method is what type of [[Party list]] allocation method it becomes equivalent to when voters vote in a "Party list"-like manner (i.e. they give maximal support to some candidates and no support to all others, as if voting on party lines). Generally, the party list case of a PR method will either be a [[Divisor method|divisor method]], such as [[D'Hondt]], or a [[Largest remainder method]], such as [[Hamilton]]. PR methods can generally be split into two categories: sequential (one winner is elected at a time) and optimal (every possible winner set is compared to each other and the best one is chosen).
 
Almost all sequential PR methods can have a single-winner method done to elect the final seat; this is because at that point there is only one seat left to elect. See [[Single transferable vote#Deciding the election of the final seat]] for an example. [[Condorcet methods]] and [[STAR voting]] can be made to work with PR methods in this way.
 
See the [[combinatorics]] article for more information.
 
== See Also ==
 
* [[Vote splitting]]
* [[Proportionate Representation]]
* [[Ideal Representation]]
* [[Justified representation]]
* [[Types of representation]]
 
== Further reading ==
 
* John Hickman and Chris Little. "Seat/Vote Proportionality in Romanian and Spanish Parliamentary Elections" ''Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans'' Vol. 2, No. 2, November 2000safd
* See the Proportional Representation Library http(created by Professor Douglas J. Amy, Mount Holyoke College and now maintained by FairVote)://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/prlib.htm
** [https://fairvote.org/archives/proportional-representation-library/ FairVote]
** [http://web.archive.org/web/20161228205929/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/prlib.htm Mount Holyoke College]
* [https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/29291 Scholarly Community Encyclopedia]
 
== References ==
[[Category:Voting theory]]
<references/>
 
=== Attribution ===
{{fromwikipedia}}
 
:''Portions copied from https://simple.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proportional_representation&oldid=7261369''
 
[[Category:Voting theory]]
[[Category:Types of representation]]
[[Category:Proportionality-related concepts]]
[[Category:Proportional voting methods|*]]
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