Proportionality for Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions
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Arguably there is some kind of coalition of 45 voters backing candidates A through J here, and since the largest opposing coalition is 8 voters, D'Hondt would say that the 45-voter coalition ought to win all 5 seats. At that point, one could eliminate all candidates outside the 45-voter coalition (K and L) at which point A through E all are a Hare quota's 1st choice and must all win. This sort of thinking is generally what Condorcet PR methods such as Schulze STV do.
Properties analagous to PSC can be considered for multi-winner voting methods that aren't proportional. For example, [[Bloc voting|Bloc Score voting]] guarantees that a majority solid coalition can elect all of its preferred candidates if they set their [[approval threshold]] between their preferred candidates and all other candidates.
== See Also ==
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