Proportionality for Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions
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'''Proportionality for Solid Coalitions''' ('''PSC''') is a criterion for proportional methods requiring that sufficiently-sized groups of voters (solid coalitions) always elect a proportional number of candidates from their set of mutually most-preferred candidates. It is the main conceptualization of Proportional Representation generally used throughout the world ([[Party List]] and [[STV]] pass versions of it.) The two main types of PSC are k-PSC (aka. Hare-PSC, a condition requiring a solid coalition comprising k Hare quotas to be
Any voting method that collects enough information to distinguish solid coalitions (generally scored or ranked methods, since preferences can be inferred from their ballots) can be forced to be PSC-compliant by first electing the proportionally correct number of candidates from each solid coalition before doing anything else.
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Looking at the top 5 lines, 50 voters, a Hare quota, mutually most prefer the set of candidates (A1-5) over all other candidates, so Hare-PSC requires at least one of (A1-5) must win. (Note that Sequential Monroe voting fails Hare-PSC in this example. However, one could forcibly make SMV do so by declaring that the candidate with the highest Monroe score within the set (A1-5) must win the first seat, for example.) <ref>https://forum.electionscience.org/t/an-example-of-maximal-divergence-between-smv-and-hare-psc/586</ref>
25 A2>A1
26 B1>
== Generalised solid coalitions ==
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7 L</blockquote>Arguably there is some kind of coalition of 45 voters backing candidates A through J here, and since the largest opposing coalition is 8 voters, D'Hondt would say that the 45-voter coalition ought to win all 5 seats. At that point, one could eliminate all candidates outside the 45-voter coalition (K and L) at which point A through E all are a Hare quota's 1st choice and must all win. This sort of thinking is generally what Condorcet PR methods such as Schulze STV do.
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