Quadratic voting: Difference between revisions

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[[File:ColoradoStateCapitolSenateChamber gobeirne.jpg|thumb|430x430px|Inside the [[Colorado State Capitol]] Building, where the quadratic voting process took place]]
'''Quadratic voting''' is a collective [[decision-making]] procedure which involves individuals allocating [[Voting|votes]] to express the ''degree'' of their preferences, rather than just the ''direction'' of their preferences.<ref name=Lalley2017-1"LalleyWeyl">{{Citecite ssrnjournal |last1 last=Lalley |first1 first=Steven P. | last2=Weyl | first2=E. Glen |date=24 December 2017 |title=Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy |language journal=enAEA Papers and Proceedings |ssrn publisher=American Economic Association | volume=108 | date=2018-05-01 | issn=2574-0768 | doi=10.1257/pandp.20181002 | pages=200353133–37}}</ref> By doing so, quadratic voting seeks to address issues of [[voting paradox]] and [[majority rule]]. Quadratic voting works by allowing users to "pay" for additional votes on a given matter to express their support for given issues more strongly, resulting in voting outcomes that are aligned with the highest willingness to pay outcome, rather than just the outcome preferred by the majority regardless of the intensity of individual preferences. The payment for votes may be through either artificial or real currencies (e.g. with tokens distributed equally among voting members or with real money).<ref name=RadicalMarkets>{{Cite book |title=Radical markets: uprooting capitalism and democracy for a just society |last1=Posner |first1=Eric A. |last2=Weyl |first2=E. Glen |date=2018 |isbn=9780691177502 |language=en |oclc=1030268293}}</ref><ref name=Lalley2017-1LalleyWeyl /> Quadratic voting is a variant of [[cumulative voting]] in the class of [[cardinal voting]]. It differs from cumulative voting by altering "the cost" and "the vote" relation from linear to quadratic.
 
Quadratic voting is based upon [[Market (economics)|market principles]], where each voter is given a [[budget]] of vote credits that they have the personal decisions and delegation to spend in order to influence the outcome of a range of decisions. If a participant has a strong support for or against a specific decision, additional votes could be allocated to proportionally demonstrate the voter's support. A vote [[pricing]] rule determines the cost of additional votes, with each vote becoming increasingly more expensive. By increasing voter [[credit]] costs, this demonstrates an individual's support and interests toward the particular decision.<ref name=PosnerQuadraticVoting>{{Cite web |url=http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/ |title=Quadratic voting |last=Posner |first=Eric |date=30 December 2014 |website=ERIC POSNER |language=en-US |access-date=9 October 2019}}</ref> If money is used, it is eventually cycled back to the voters based upon per capita. Both [[w:E Glen Weyl|E Glen Weyl]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Weyl |first=E. Glen |date=1 July 2017 |title=The robustness of quadratic voting |journal=Public Choice |language=en |volume=172 |issue=1 |pages=75–107 |doi=10.1007/s11127-017-0405-4 |issn=1573-7101}} (see also [[w:Semantic Scholar|Semantic Scholar]] id 189841584)</ref> and [[w:Steven Lalley|Steven Lalley]]{{when|date=22:00, 22 December 2021 (UTC)}} conducted research in which they claim to demonstrate that this decision-making policy expedites efficiency as the number of voters increases. The simplified formula on how quadratic voting functions is<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/saving-democracy-with-quadratic-equations-1421425742 |title=Saving Democracy With Quadratic Equations |last=Ellenberg |first=Jordan |date=16 January 2015 |work=Wall Street Journal |access-date=19 November 2019|language=en-US|issn=0099-9660}}</ref>
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